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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                      EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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    ROSIE MARTINEZ,
                                        16-CV-79(NM)
              Plaintiff
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               -against- :
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                                        United States Courthouse
                                        Brooklyn, New York
8
    CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL,
                                        November 7, 2022
                                        2:30 p.m.
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              Defendant. :
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                         TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT
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                   BEFORE THE HONORABLE NINA MORRISON
                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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    APPEARANCES:
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    For the Plaintiff:
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                                   BY: GABRIEL PAUL HARVIS, ESQ.
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                                       BAREE N. FETT, ESQ.
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                                   BY: KAVIN S. THADANI, ESQ. MORGAN C. MCKINNEY, ESQ.
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                                       JEFFREY F. FRANK, ESQ.
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    Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
    produced by computer-aided transcription.
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              THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Civil cause for an oral
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    argument, Case No. 16-CV-79, Martinez v. City of New York,
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    et al.
              Counsel, please state your appearances for the
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    record, starting with plaintiff.
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              MR. HARVIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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              Gabriel Harvis of the firm Elefterakis, Elefterakis
8
    & Panek for the plaintiff, Rosie Martinez.
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              MS. FETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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              Baree Fett from the law firm Elefterakis,
    Elefterakis & Panek for the plaintiff, Rosie Martinez.
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              THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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              MR. THADANI: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
14
              Kavin Thadani from the Office of the Corporation
    Counsel on behalf of the defendants.
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              MS. MCKINNEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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              Morgan McKinney, also with the Office of Corp.
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    Counsel, for the defendants.
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              THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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              MR. FRANK: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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              Jeffrey Frank, also with Corp. Counsel, for the
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    defendants.
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              THE COURT: All right. Welcome, everyone.
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              So we are here today for oral argument on what are,
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    by my count, about 26 or so motions in limine filed by the
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various parties. As you know, the case was referred to me on October 28th. I kept this trial date because I know these dates are hard to get these days and you have been waiting for a trial for some time. So my apologies in advance if I ask you what may seem like very basic questions about the history of this case and some of the facts.

I have reviewed all of your briefing and a substantial part of the underlying record. My goal today really is to just make sure that I understand that history and understand your positions, so please don't take too much of my questions about which way I might be leaning on some of these issues.

I gather that a number of the pending motions are now moot, in whole or in part, because of some of the things you said in your responses, so I may ask just to confirm that at the end, but I'm going to focus today mostly on what is in dispute.

I plan to issue a written opinion on at least some of the issues here. I think some of them probably need a bit more consideration after argument and you would benefit from some more specific guidance. I know we're hitting up against the Thanksgiving holiday, so my plan and my hope is to get you a ruling hopefully next week and, if not, before the break so that you can plan your witnesses and evidence accordingly.

After we talk about these motions in limine, I want

4 1 to discuss some trial management issues, including scheduling 2 and how I think we might work voir dire and the charges and 3 that sort of thing. All right? 4 Will more than one counsel be arguing for each side today or is just one of you going to handle it, or does it 5 6 depend on the motion and the issue? 7 MR. HARVIS: Yeah, we haven't decided that, 8 Your Honor, if that's okay. 9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 MR. HARVIS: Great. MR. THADANI: Your Honor, I believe, depending on 11 12 which motion, different counsel will be speaking on the 13 issues. 14 THE COURT: You're welcome to switch off. What I do is, I'll let you which motion I'm going to do. I'm going to 15 16 take them a little bit out of order, and then you can just 17 tell me who's doing it. And you can remain seated while 18 you're arguing, just speak in the microphone so the court 19 reporter can hear you. 20 And I will let her know that she is welcome to 21 remind any of us, including me, to speak more slowly. It is a 22 bad habit I picked up from all my years as a litigator that I 23 am trying to break. 24 All right. So the first motion I wanted to ask you 25 about is plaintiff's motion to allow some cross-examination

5 1 into an incident that led to an IAB investigation for one of 2 the officer defendants. 3 Can you let me know how to pronounce his name? it Laliberte? 4 5 MR. THADANI: Laliberte, Your Honor. THE COURT: Laliberte. Okay. Thank you. 6 7 Mr. Thadani, I understand your argument to be that 8 this isn't proper impeachment of the Rule 608(b) because 9 Sergeant Laliberte did not technically lie to the investigators in 2013 when he was asked about this incident 10 11 regarding a time when he was caught on video punching a 12 detainee; is that right? 13 MR. THADANI: Sort of, Your Honor. I don't believe the record is -- I mean, frankly, the record establishes, I 14 15 believe based on the deposition testimony, that he didn't lie. 16 I believe that plaintiff's counsel, as I indicated in the 17 motion papers, is taking the -- the paperwork they're relying 18 upon, I believe, is vague and not clear as to the fact that I 19 believe what plaintiff's counsel is asserting is that what 20 happened was, after this arrest, this incident that occurred, 21 Sergeant Laliberte was questioned about it. He made denials 22 about using any force, was shown a video recording showing 23 that he had used force and then basically admitted/apologized 24 for it. I don't believe that that is clearly expressed in 25

the record that they're utilizing. There is no clear record that that is what happened. Sergeant Laliberte testified at his deposition that is not what happened. And so our assertion is that there -- and moreover, as we argue in the papers, there wasn't a finding, there wasn't charges brought. So, for instance, after that occurred, the NYPD could've brought charges for making a misstatement or a false statement during an interview, during an investigation. They didn't do that, that often happens. They didn't do that. And investigator substantiate that sort of allegation. And, therefore, our position is, there's no finding.

And also, the record doesn't assert that that is what occurred, that there was a false statement made. And we believe, especially given the nature of the underlying action, which is Sergeant Laliberte punching an individual, given that this is an excessive force case, sort of ties into a corollary argument with respect to Rule 403 and the unfair prejudice, that if it's presented the way I believe plaintiff's counsel intends to present it, which is highlighted I think by the fact that a video recording of the punch was listed on their exhibit list, which doesn't really speak to whether there was a false statement or not in the investigation, that that intention and the underlying incident itself then makes this evidence substantially more prejudicial than probative.

THE COURT: I haven't reviewed that part of his

deposition. But when you say he denied or disputed certain aspects of what plaintiff is contending, is he denying what was in the IAB report, that he was asked if he had -- and I'm quoting from an excerpt of it that was in the briefs -- observed any members of service punch any of the partygoers, he stated no; when asked if any of the arrestees had any injuries or made any complaints against any member of service, he said no; after viewing the video footage that showed him punching, and then it's redacted, by a detainee in the face, Sergeant Laliberte stated that punching that individual was a bad decision, he made a mistake and is embarrassed by his actions.

As I understand it, he's not disputing that the sequence of what he was asked and what he was shown and what he answered in the IAB report is incorrect, or is he disputing that?

MR. THADANI: No, I don't believe he's disputing that. I don't recall specifically how precise the deposition questioning was. I don't think it was as specific as asking about that particular sequence of events. I believe the question was more broad as to did you deny using force during the course of that investigation, and he said no.

And I believe actually there was some sequential questioning with respect to chronology of events as in, like, when you were first asked what happened, did you deny it or

did you not state use force? And he said basically that he was up front and honest about what happened and felt remorseful about it. That's what I believe the questioning was. I don't have it in front of me either, Your Honor. I don't believe it was as precise though as denying specific portions that you just read.

THE COURT: But he's not disputing -- and I know there's a separate issue about whether the extrinsic evidence of punching could come in, but he's not disputing that he did, as the report says, punch a detainee in the face?

MR. THADANI: No. No.

THE COURT: Okay. And I understand as your argument, he was asked about whether he observed anyone else punch or injure an arrestee. And he said no. And your argument is, it's not really proper impeachment to say he lied because he wasn't directly asked, did you yourself punch or harm any cuffed arrestee.

MR. THADANI: That's our position. Frankly, it's a very straightforward issue. And frankly, if the sequencing occurred the way plaintiff's counsel asserts, the report could have very easily said that, that Sergeant Laliberte was asked whether he punched any individual, and he denied it, he was then shown the video, and he admitted it.

And then like I said earlier, Your Honor, in that scenario, internal affairs NYPD could've charged him for

making a false statement that he just admitted that he would've made in that scenario, and that didn't occur. And the report does not clearly state that. It's, in our view I guess, ambiguous and unclear as to specifically what he was asked and what he denied to with respect to his own actions, as opposed to actions he observed other people taking.

THE COURT: But it seems clear that the investigator who was asking these questions had the video at the time he asked him the questions, right? He was saying, tell me what happened, he gave an answer, and then he confronted him with the video, and then he gave an additional answer and apologized. It all happened within that sequence, right?

MR. THADANI: I mean, I don't -- I don't know. I don't know exactly. I mean, certainly by reading it, that would be the impression, that the investigator had the video at the time the questioning occurred. I think that is true.

THE COURT: So don't you think there's a fair argument that it's at least materially misleading for him? You know, he's being asked about what happened in this event, the investigator seems to be giving him a chance to tell his version of what happened. By leaving out this important fact, he obviously knew he wasn't supposed to be punching a cuffed arrestee, that he is, at the very least, intentionally misleading the investigator, and that that bears on his truthfulness for purposes of 608?

MR. THADANI: I believe that argument can be made, that perhaps -- again, I think it's unclear, the record is unclear as to what specific questions he was asked, either the investigator's notes as to what was -- you know, I don't know how long of an interview. Depending on the sequencing, certainly that argument could be made.

I think what we would add on with respect to that is, again, even to the extent this questioning were permitted by Your Honor, I believe that there is -- you know, plaintiff's counsel has stated in their briefing something to the effect of certain facts with respect to this need to be admitted and not really explaining what that means.

And I think given the underlying nature of the action and given what the issue is in this case, even to the extent Your Honor is inclined to admit evidence or testimony or questioning with respect to this, there's a way to do it without revealing, for instance, what plaintiff's counsel repeatedly states as sort of classifying this as a sucker punch, right?

For instance, there could be questioning to the effect of, you know, you were involved in an arrest on a certain date, you know, X number of months before this incident. And during that course of the arrest, you took certain actions. And following that arrest, you were asked questions about the actions you took. And you denied -- these

are just an example, questions they could ask. You denied taking a certain action. And you were shown a video recording showing what happened during that arrest, and then you admitted to that action, something to that effect, right?

And that's what plaintiff's counsel is getting at.

That doesn't reveal, for instance, what I think is really the more troubling nature of this is, I believe it is a attempt to backdoor what would otherwise be improper character evidence and improper propensity evidence because it involves a use of force by --

THE COURT: And I understand that, that that's the argument. I guess the concern I have is that without being able to confront him with the specifics of the incident, the jury's understanding of why it bears on his truthfulness, that he only admitted something this serious when he knew there was a video, is lessened. And the plaintiff is entitled to the full benefit of evidence, not the video itself, but at least the circumstances under which it happened to show why this is a situation under which a truthful officer would be expected to be forthcoming.

So how do you address that?

MR. THADANI: I understand that, Your Honor. I think our feeling would be, this would raise the 403 argument again. Like, for us, that would be substantially that prejudic- -- that probative need for the jury to understand,

we believe, would be substantially -- would be outweighed, substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect given the fact that this is a case in which some of four officers -- I know this is probably part of another motion, as Your Honor is aware, two out of four of the officers allegedly used excessive force. This may be one of them, I don't know. I guess maybe they'll tell us. But it -- presumably there's an excessive force allegation against him. Maybe if there wasn't, it'd be different.

But to the extent there is an excessive force allegation made against him specifically, and this is a case involving excessive force, this is the danger of the jury hearing then that he has, within a year, roughly a year prior to the incident, used excessive force against a handcuffed individual, which is the allegation in this case, I think argue would be there has to be compromise somewhere in the middle where that underlying facts are not necessary in order for the jury to assess credibility of this particular individual who is going to testify.

THE COURT: Can you see any version of those facts specifically? And I'm not asking you to necessarily decide what the testimony is going to be or exactly where the bounds are going to be, but somewhere between -- it could be any possible incident, which could be a traffic stop all the way to punching a cuffed arrestee. What do you think would be the

fair compromise in terms of allowing some questioning?

MR. THADANI: I mean, I don't think -- I mean, I have to think through it a little bit, but, you know, thinking through it now, I don't think it would be the nature of the force used for sure. I mean, it may be used force on an individual, perhaps. I mean, again, I still feel like given the nature of this case, there are real 403 concerns. I think with this kind of questioning, there's a way to have it be a little bit less -- like, for instance, the examples I gave, which I understand maybe is on one realm, I think would help remedy those issues a little bit more, but I understand Your Honor's point.

But I think perhaps if Your Honor, again, is inclined to permit this questioning and maybe something to the effect of use of force. But even that, you know, I hesitate to say it because I still think given the fact that's what the claim is in this case presumably against this individual, again, I think maybe the equation does change if there's no excessive force claim being brought against him. That may be a different analysis.

THE COURT: So I want to come back to that point about excessive force when we get to the issue of which defendants are alleged to have used it.

So let me ask plaintiff's counsel. What's your answer to the concern the City's raised about the video itself

in particular being; A, extrinsic evidence under 608 and the whole incident being impermissible propensity evidence?

Because the case law says, the more similar it is to the allegations in question, the more skeptically and more carefully I have to view it before it's allowed in.

MR. HARVIS: Well, we agree it's a quite similar. So we certainly agree with that. We don't have any intention of offering the video in our case in chief unless there is some denials from the officer. So we were not planning on offering that as, you know, case in chief evidence.

But I guess I would just step back and start where Mr. Thadani did and talk about the context a little bit. So this individual was the sergeant, a supervisor, the desk officer of this precinct. So he's seated right across, about as far as I am from Your Honor, where Ms. Martinez was handcuffed in that room. And, you know, we know that a year earlier he had, you know, punched this person while they were handcuffed and never mentioned it until he was confronted about it.

So his job is to record what happens in the precinct during that night. And we know -- it's actually one of admissions that we got from them in discovery -- is that there was no notation. Sergeant Laliberte made no record at all about this. So, and then when he came in to testify after we got all the discovery that led Judge Pollak to recommend

terminating sanctions, we asked him what he remembered about that night as a desk officer. And his answer was zero.

That's how much he remembers.

So, you know, we believe that on these facts we're entitled to have every opportunity to challenge his credibility and the validity of his claim that he actually doesn't remember anything because it's critical to understand why there was no record made of this event.

And so we think it all comes down to credibility.

We think it's all wrapped up in concealment. And we think

that many of the facts that underlie the prior incident are,

in our view, highly probative, which really changes the

equation in terms of, it has to be substantially outweighed by

the prejudice, not just outweighed.

So the more probative it is, the more the prejudice would have to outweigh it in order for it to tip the scales. And we believe that the prejudice has to be not just prejudice, but undue prejudice. And in a case where someone happened to do something where revealing their untruthfulness happens to show that it's unlikely that they were truthful in this instance is precisely the outcome that the rules were intended to, you know, ensure.

THE COURT: And if I understand how you intend to present at this point, you're seeking only to ask him, when you call him -- obviously you've conceded that as a

defendant -- you can lead him on essentially your direct case leading about the questions and answers he was asked at the IAB and you don't intend to offer any extrinsic evidence unless he denies some fact that's refuted by the video in which case I guess we'll take that up, although my understanding is, that's probably barred as impermissible extrinsic evidence under 608 as well.

MR. HARVIS: I agree with everything Your Honor said, yes.

THE COURT: Are there any other records -- until you begin your argument, Mr. Thadani, I wasn't sure if there were other, statements, other records that relate to the specific questions and answers that he was asked during this 2013 investigation other than the IAB report.

MR. THADANI: Not that I believe has been produced or disclosed between the parties.

THE COURT: Okay. And you searched for them yourself when you were attempting to investigate the circumstances of this?

MR. THADANI: Yes, Your Honor, there was. I don't remember all the specifics of the discovery dispute with respect to this, how much needed to be produced with respect to this particular investigation, but certainly we produced within the scope of what we were, you know, ordered to do so and while we -- what we agreed amongst the parties and I

17 believe under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Pollak. 1 2 One thing I do want to note. I don't know that it 3 necessarily moves to the needle, but just to correct the 4 record, plaintiff's counsel just stated something to the effect of Defendant Laliberte testified he had no recollection 5 of this incident. That is true. He was deposed twice in this 6 7 case. He was deposed as a nonparty initially, and he 8 testified in that manner very early on during discovery. Then 9 testified again. 10 THE COURT: Let me just clarify this incident. You 11 mean the incident involving Ms. Martinez? 12 MR. THADANI: Yes. Sorry. My apologies, 13 Your Honor. I should've clarified. 14 Yes, with respect to the incident underlying this particular lawsuit involving Ms. Martinez, he testified as a 15 16 nonparty early on in discovery and at that point, when he wasn't a defendant, testified that he had no recollection of 17 18 the incident. Yes, he did testify consistently then when he 19 was named as a defendant and deposed again the same way. 20 I just wanted to clarify that for the record. I 21 don't know that, like I said, necessarily changes the needle 22 per se, but just so the record is clear. 23 THE COURT: I understand. 24 Okay. Let's move on to the next one. 25 Next I'd like to talk about plaintiff's motion to

preclude the headshot identifications and kind of relatedly to admit some evidence of the City's discovery violations and sanctions.

So let me start with the headshot evidence. I don't know which counsel for the City would like to address it.

MR. THADANI: I can handle it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

So explain to me relatively concisely what sort of, quote/unquote, headshot evidence you seek to offer and how you see it coming in and explain to me why you think it's relevant to the claims that the jury is going to hear?

MR. THADANI: Sure.

So, as I think Your Honor is aware, we listed certain headshot photographs as exhibits. I believe it's all under one exhibit right now. It's II. I believe the intention would be to subpart that in among multiple exhibits. I think there is six photographs probably there. It's a portion of the photographs that the plaintiff reviewed early on in this case to identify what at the time were John Doe defendants.

So the case was brought. Plaintiff had already testified at what's called a 50-H hearing and gave a description of what the two individuals she claimed assaulted her looked like in terms of facial hair, body type, age, clothing, et cetera.

Early on in the case, plaintiff's counsel -- I was not a counsel to the case at the time, but I believe that ultimately there were photographs exchanged in two different parts. Some photographs were in a Civilian Complaint Review Board file. And other photographs -- maybe about six or so photographs in there. And then about 30 photographs, I believe headshot photographs, were produced unlabeled to the plaintiff's counsel in discovery with the intention that I think the idea I believe behind that was that those are the individuals that appeared on the role call as potentially present at the precinct during the relevant period where the plaintiff alleged that the use of force occurred.

THE COURT: Let me stop you for one second.

When you say relatively early in the case, do you know when it was that these photos were produced?

MR. THADANI: I think within the first three to six months. I mean, I don't know specifically.

THE COURT: Three to six months after the complaint was filed or after the CCRB --

MR. THADANI: I believe after the complaint was filed. And again, this is not a pro se case, but in pro se cases, this is a fairly typical scenario. The Valentin order is issued. John Doe defendants need to be identified by the City and also the Corporation Counsel. And sometimes that results in photographs being provided to the plaintiff to

identify somebody after descriptions are given of who did what and who are the proper defendants in this case.

So that occurred here. There were, I think, roughly 36 photographs in total, give or take, that were provided to the plaintiff's counsel. There are letters on the docket that relate to that review with some of which we cited in our papers.

And ultimately plaintiff identified two individuals as who she's stated were the ones who assaulted her. Those are former defendants now, Forgione and Weitzman. They remain as defendants in the case on the excessive force claim all the way through all of discovery and our summary judgment motion. In fact, today, the complaint that's in this case still names Forgione and Weitzman as the individuals who used excessive force on her, even though they're no longer defendants in the case.

It was on summary judgment in opposition that plaintiff presented an affidavit that stated that Eric Ryan, who is one of the defendants, and one of either Joseph Digennaro, David Camhi or Keith Laliberte, who are the other defendants in the case, assaulted her.

The purpose for -- to get to your question, what we're sort of intending I think for trial is these photographs are relevant to credibility primarily. By plaintiff's counsel's admission, they listed two of these photographs as

their own exhibits and in the JPTO stated that these photographs are relevant to credibility and personal involvement.

And the reason why is because -- it goes to credibility is because she had photographs of many individuals at the precinct, including the four defendants who are in the case now, and discounted them. She identified two individuals and not these other individuals, including the four defendants in the case now. The fact that that occurred, I think from our view, is clearly relevant to her credibility in terms of the events that she's saying occurred and who committed them.

THE COURT: When you say the photos are relevant to credibility, you want to cross-examine her on the fact that she received 36 photographs including the named defendants and did not select any of them as the individuals she believed were there, or that she had selected two who are no longer defendants in this case?

MR. THADANI: I mean I think our -- you know, I don't know for sure, but I think our intention would be to question about the process. So you were provided photo -- you gave descriptions, et cetera, you were provided with photographs, you reviewed those photographs and perhaps using some as exhibits to show her some of the photographs she reviewed, have her, I think, yes, establish that she identified two individuals, she didn't identify the four

individuals who are defendants in the case now.

You know, in terms of exactly the sequencing and questioning, you know, I'm not entirely sure, but I think ultimately it would be on a cross-examination, questioning her through the process of reviewing photographs and who she picked and who she didn't pick.

THE COURT: So let me ask you a little bit about your theory of relevancy because now I -- thank you, I understand the chronology of it better.

I think I would understand your point better if this were a misidentification case. You know, but in this case as I understand it, and correct me if I'm wrong, there's a real credibility issue for the jury to resolve in terms of what happened in the precinct because Ms. Martinez is saying she was physically assaulted by two of these officers and others failed to intervene or stood by in some way intentionally and egregiously.

And as I understand it, the City and the individuals are claiming that that didn't happen, that she essentially inflicted these injuries upon herself and then is falsely claiming now that it was done to her.

So if that's the case and there's no dispute that these four officers were in the station house and interacted with her in some way, which is why they're named defendants and why summary judgment wasn't granted against them, why is

her failure to identify the photos some months after the event relevant to her credibility about whether she's telling the truth or not?

MR. THADANI: Sure. I have several responses to that. First of all, we didn't actually move on excessive force, so there was no determination as to whether the --actually don't know that all of these individuals interacted with the plaintiff. I don't know that -- I don't think the evidence is necessarily going to bare that out. I think it's probably undisputed that three of them did. Whether defendant Laliberte --

THE COURT: Which three?

MR. THADANI: Ryan, who was the arresting officer,
Digennaro and Camhi. You know, I don't know what the evidence
is exactly.

THE COURT: Let me ask about the fourth while we're on this real quick.

MR. THADANI: Sure.

THE COURT: And then Laliberte, there's no dispute that he was seated at the desk, as plaintiff's counsel said, you know, within view of the room, right?

MR. THADANI: He was a desk officer. He was seated there. Whether or not he was there at the time depending on which version of events you go with, that I can't -- you know, I don't know what the evidence will bare on that. But with

respect to the fact that he was a desk officer at the time, yes, he was.

THE COURT: And "at the time" meaning in the precinct on the night that she was in custody during the hours she was there?

MR. THADANI: Yes, that's correct.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. THADANI: I think, again, our -- I didn't read plaintiff's counsel as -- their opposition as indicating this wasn't relevant so much as it opens the door to other information, which I just have a response with respect to that as well.

With respect to Your Honor's question as to relevance and credibility, yes, this is ultimately a question about did X happen or did Y happen. But the fact that, given our contention is that this did not occur, any details that she gives that are inconsistent that indicate an inability to identify the alleged -- I mean, she's in a room by herself, it's well lit, no one's wearing a mask, this is pre-COVID, one would think that she would remember these people's faces.

And the fact that she identified different individuals as the ones who assailed her -- and again, this is not like 30 seconds. She's alleging this goes on for ten, 15 plus minutes. Okay? And she's bringing this lawsuit to testify about it. The fact that she doesn't identify these

individuals -- in fact, there are statements on the record, on the docket from the plaintiff's attorneys, that says we've ruled out these people as even being involved.

Now, two of those people are defendants today.

Okay? And the fact that they listed these photographs and indicated it's relevant to personal involvement, which is still an issue as we've raised already, there's four defendants on a claim involving two people, and to her credibility, they've conceded that much. And again, I think it's -- it clearly bears on her credibility generally that she saw photographs, identified two other people, did not -- most importantly that she didn't identify these people. She saw their photographs.

And to the extent plaintiff's counsel argues authenticity or the photographs don't look like them, that's a weight argument. The jury can see the individuals who are sitting in the courtroom and the photographs and can make an assessment on their own, do these photographs look similar?

Do person A and B who are dismissed look like person C, D, E and F or not?

But that to -- our view is that it's clearly relevant to her credibility, even if it's not the ultimate issue, which is, you know, did X occur, did Y occur? Any statement she gives with respect to the incident bears on her credibility as to whether it occurred, especially when we're

saying it didn't happen at all.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand your position.

Let me ask counsel for plaintiff, is the City correct that you're not opposing admission of the photos on relevancy grounds, and that your argument is that if they are used to cross-examine her, that the jury should also hear evidence of the City's discovery violations because the delay is, in some part, responsible for her failure to identify them or might be responsible?

MR. HARVIS: No. I think we're arguing part of that. But I think that we -- I think that we think that they're irrelevant to her credibility.

THE COURT: Irrelevant?

MR. HARVIS: Yes, irrelevant.

And the reason why we think that is because, well, a couple of things. One is, there are procedures that parties use during discovery if they want to record someone's response to photographs. You know, you can -- at a deposition, you can bring out the photographs, you can say, hey, will you look at these and tell me what you think. You know, and is this the person, is this not the person? There was no procedure of any kind even remotely resembling that. They never asked her about the photographs. They deposed her twice, never asked her a single question, never served a discovery demand that

required her to respond to these.

What they're doing is, they're taking her attorney's statements that were put on the record as part of a good faith process to narrow down who should be in this case and, you know, treating those as if they're statements out of the mouth of Rosie Martinez in a session where everyone understood what was being asked and what was going on. I mean, for all -- this record, it might -- she may very well have identified them and counsel thought there was some strategic reason to describe it in another way.

I mean, I'm just saying there's a lot of layers between her review of the photographs and the information that would provide a good faith basis for them to question her about it to begin with.

And then if I --

THE COURT: And let me just ask you real quick.

MR. HARVIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: Was there ever any array -- and either counsel address this. Did Captain Hanrahan or anyone else during the IAB investigation show her any photographs? And if not, does anyone know why not?

MR. HARVIS: I will let defense counsel answer that.

MR. THADANI: No. I mean, the investigation, it wasn't an internal affairs investigation per se. It was a command-level investigation. And the reason it was a

triggered was because there was a prisoner injured in custody and it was triggered by the fact that plaintiff's counsel at central booking requested medical attention, was sent to the hospital with respect to that.

THE COURT: So why weren't -- is -- are photos not typically shown as part of that process to see if they can identify who the individuals were that allegedly caused the injuries?

MR. THADANI: It does happen. It does happen. The investigation documents that we have indicate that plaintiff denied wrongdoing by members of service and, therefore, that process was not undertaken. And the documentation reflects the observations of two of the defendants in the case, Ryan and Camhi with respect to her punching a wall and kicking at a cabinet and needing to be restrained as a result. So it didn't get to the point where there was identification procedures.

THE COURT: And as I understand it -- I don't want to get into the -- into all the issues around the handwritten report just yet, but I think my understanding is that plaintiff is denying that that interview ever took place. She's claiming she was never interviewed, and of course Captain Hanrahan is not here to answer that question himself or give his version of what he did during the investigation.

MR. THADANI: That is accurate on both accounts.

THE COURT: But as far as we know, nobody during the command -- it's called command-level investigation?

MR. THADANI: Yes.

THE COURT: Ever showed her any photographs of any of the individuals?

MR. THADANI: Not that I'm ware of.

One thing I will say, Your Honor, with respect to the questions about deposition. So I was not counsel at the first deposition. However, at that point, Forgione and Weitzman were substituted as defendants for the John Doe defendants, and there was no -- there was no questioning on the photographs. That is true. With respect to the second deposition, there could have been and would have been questioning. And there is a record of that.

So first of all, that deposition was very limited in scope, partially because of plaintiff's counsel and my negotiation with respect to certain topics that would be raised and moreover because the magistrate judge's view with respect to the proper scope of that deposition.

THE COURT: And that was because it was necessitated by all the late disclosures after that?

MR. THADANI: Partially. I mean, really I think what the precipitous for primarily the second deposition was, was a change in claims and damages that were being alleged in the case. There were several more claims being added. There

was a different set of damages being asserted. There was a lot more medical treatment being asserted, et cetera.

So generally the deposition was limited in scope with respect to new claims and damages either newly being asserted or being asserted since the last deposition, so really like a change in circumstances.

Plaintiff's counsel has represented several times in attempt to amend the complaint to clarify who she was alleging the excessive force claim was against. That never happened. Still hasn't happened.

Before the deposition, I sent plaintiff's counsel an e-mail, it was on March 18th, 2019, and stated that -- and this was almost a year before the deposition actually took place, the plaintiff's deposition, you know, we talked about what were the topic areas that were appropriate for that deposition.

And I state in that e-mail that we had talked -- it was reflecting a phone conversation that we had, that we talked about that if the plaintiff makes any amendments to the complaint, that we would question about those amendments. And the idea behind that was exactly this. Had plaintiff amended the complaint to name different defendants on the excessive force claim, I would have asked and shown those photographs and asked these questions.

Moreover, at the end of that deposition, and it's on

the transcript, I reserved the right to continue the deposition in the event that plaintiff amends the complaint to change her allegations with respect to that claim. That also still has not happened. So I just want to just address that because seems to be like a big point here.

THE COURT: And did you ever go back to the magistrate and request a third deposition after --

MR. THADANI: At that point, no, because discovery had -- by the time they changed their view, which again still hasn't fully been cemented, discovery is long closed, we're in motion for summary judgment practice. And so no, that did not happen.

THE COURT: Understood.

I think before we got into that issue, you were going to address the threshold question about the relevancy and admissibility of the headshot identification.

MR. HARVIS: Thank you. I'll try to do that very briefly.

So yes, I'm glad that the Hanrahan report and the IAB and CCRB investigation is now something that we've all discussed, because when we were dealing with all of this, when we were -- when plaintiff, who by the way -- you know, we talk about her giving a 50-H and having these depositions, I mean, she has repeatedly described the officers who assaulted her. She's done it consistently in detail, and it was on the basis,

on the strength of her identification that we had tried this process in good faith to get these photographs.

And the reason why that was necessary is because there was a really severe coordinated deception and concealment going on where when we were negotiating with them about the photographs and trying to work with Judge Pollak to get the disclosures that we needed, we didn't know about the Hanrahan report, we didn't know that this guy, Lieutenant Camhi, had called internal affairs and called in that a woman had been injuring herself, we didn't know that documents in the Hanrahan report would indicate that both Ryan and Camhi had restrained Ms. Martinez.

If we had known all of that, we would've obviously looked at the photographs in a different light than -- and this is really what we're getting at with the question of, you know, what is the jury going to be learn about this, because there's -- there's -- the reason why terminating sanctions were recommended in this case is because I believe Judge Pollak described it as, you know, the worst instance of people chasing their tails without the right information that she'd ever seen in her career.

And so, you know, we think that the idea of taking two separate productions where in a very choreographed process where we were trying to get to the truth but we had none of the information that we should've had, and then subselect from

those 36 photographs this piecemeal exhibit of six photographs, we don't know when they were taken, we have no idea if they resemble these people or if they resemble them on the night of January 23rd, 2015. And there were plenty of opportunities to take discovery on that, to sort that out, to get information on that. None of that was done.

And the idea that now, you know, Ms. Martinez is going to be presented with this evidence and that the arguments are going to be made in a vacuum about how crazy it is that she couldn't pick these people out, we think it's misleading to the jury, we think it's not probative in the least, and we think it's highly prejudicial, and we think 403 should exclude the evidence.

THE COURT: So if I were to allow the defendants to ask her a limited series of questions about, you know, was she provided photographs or confirming that she was provided certain photographs at a certain time and she can answer truthfully and to the best of her ability, you know, whether she recognized them or was able to identify them and why and you can certainly ask follow-up questions when you examine her, what, if anything, would you have the jury be told about that history and how would you have it come in without this turning into an unwarranted mini trial about discovery violations that the jury will not understand and would risk making a mess of things?

MR. HARVIS: I think what we would want to say is something like early in this case around the same time that these photographs were produced to Ms. Martinez's counsel, a judge in this court determined that they had violated 14 court orders in connection with the provision of information that was needed to identify them and recommended that the case be dismissed without a trial. And while that order wasn't ultimately adopted, that was a recommendation of a judge of this court regarding their conduct in the events surrounding these photographs.

And also, you know, you should know that Ms. Martinez herself, there's no record that she ever even saw all these photographs or what the circumstances were. I mean, that's my concern, is that they really lack a good faith basis to how do they decide whether she's being honest or not when she responds to these questions. They weren't there when she showed -- was showed the photographs. She's speaking, you know what I'm saying, through an attorney writing a letter to the Court.

And so I just think, she may say -- they may say, well, did you ever receive these photographs? And she could truthfully say no. Did you ever go to your attorney's office? And now we're in the realm of attorney-client communication and what happened in our office with me and Ms. Fett and Rosie Martinez. And they're allowed to cross her and suggest

that her answers are -- she's lying and now they're going to cross her with letters that her attorneys wrote. I just think the whole thing -- there's a reason why it's a much easier path to just say that that's not an appropriate area of cross-examination on this record and we don't need to talk about the sanctions. That's kind of how we're seeing it land.

THE COURT: Mr. Thadani, briefly, what's your response to the concern Mr. Harvis raises about attorney-client privilege and communications with her attorneys given that the only evidence you have -- I wasn't aware that there was no formal photo array or that she wasn't asked about in her depositions, but given that the only -- if she says I haven't seen these photographs, your only option is to cross-examine her on statements she made to her attorneys.

MR. THADANI: Yes. I have responses to the other points, but I'll address your question first.

So my response is, first of all, we don't believe this is an attorney-client issue. There's letters on the docket filed by the plaintiff's attorneys, and again, I believe those statements are imputed to plaintiff, that describe what occurred. So if there was a privilege, it's waived because it states that she reviewed these photographs. There's two, I believe at least two letters, one of which indicates she has reviewed photographs in the CCRB file, and these are not the folks who she alleges assaulted her.

There's one statement like that.

And then there's also then I think more than one letter that indicates the review of the remaining photographs and indicating that the parties were in an attempt to identify the proper John Doe defendants and these defendants, that process is over, and we're amending the complaint to name these two individuals.

So, first of all, to the extent there's an attorney-client issue, I don't believe that there is because, again, it's been waived and it's on the docket and those are -- even though they're through counsel, there are plaintiff's statements through counsel as what occurred, that she did review them.

And that's how we got where we got. We would not have had -- like, how else did these two defendants get into the case, Forgione and Weitzman? She did not have -- their name isn't in any other paperwork as reflecting involvement in the case. And it's clear on the docket that she reviewed photographs. Then we provided the names of those two individuals that she identified. And then those individuals were named in the complaint as the defendants in the case.

THE COURT: Let me just stop you right there.

Are you disputing, Mr. Harvis, that she did at some point identify Forgione -- and who was the other defendant?

MR. THADANI: Weitzman.

MR. HARVIS: Yes. Based on the information we had at that time -- and these people are similar looking to the descriptions that she provided, and so no, we're not denying that. But the City is the one making the motion that nothing related to dismiss claims can be discussed at the trial, but now we're going to be informing the jury of who all the prior defendants were and how -- what the process was of amending the complaint.

I mean, I understand -- I don't think that should be done, but I can't imagine how that could be done without us going through why all of that was necessary, which I don't think is evidence that they want to have come in at the trial.

MR. THADANI: May I address that.

So, first of all, I don't think our intent is to get into amending complaints. It's more about who she identified as opposed to complaints were amended or not, who were named as defendants. I don't think we need to get into that level.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. So you do plan to ask her about naming defendants?

MR. THADANI: No. No. No, not intending.

THE COURT: So just simply the fact of the identification of two officers who are not defendants in this case --

MR. THADANI: I think it's as simple as, you review photographs, and then showing her the two photographs of the

people she identified confirming those are the people she identified, showing her the other four photographs of the defendants; now you reviewed these photographs, you didn't identify them. Essentially like long and short.

With respect to the reference to sanctions and all that, I think what I'd say is, first of all, it's unclear to me why plaintiff's counsel can't simply say we didn't have documentation at the time. Like, for instance, if we ask those questions on a redirect examination, why they can't elicit the lack of certain documentation that they think is important that would've affected that identification process without raising sanctions and recommendations by a magistrate judge that were not adopted. And again, that would lead to a mini trial with respect to the sanctions whether they're appropriate or not.

Moreover --

THE COURT: And I see your point about the recommendations that weren't adopted, but the part of Judge Pollak's R and R as to liability and as to the violations was adopted and followed by Judge Donnelly and, again, referenced and adopted followed by Judge Kovner in her summary judgment decision when she declined to disturb the sanctions recommendation but did adopt the liability portion.

So, you know, I see plaintiff's request as coming in two parts. They may want both of those, but potentially I

could see a middle ground in which -- and I'm not saying this is what we're going to do, but in which the jury is told that there were these 14 discovery violations and that the photos of your clients currently were not produced or that the names of them and that the records identifying them were not produced until after those violations came to light, but is not told what recommendations were from a magistrate that ultimately weren't adopted by the district judge.

MR. THADANI: Judge, a couple of points. I'm not sure what Your Honor means by the liability recommendation was adopted.

THE COURT: Sorry. The aspect of the R and R, there's a portion in Judge Donnelly's decision where she says I'm adopting this portion of Magistrate Judge Pollak's decision in full as to -- and I apologize if it wasn't the word liability, but something along the lines as to the fault or the violations themselves.

MR. THADANI: Sure.

THE COURT: Finding as fact that those were willful and intentional violations. And again, the number of them, 14, whether that comes in or not is, you know, something I'd want to consider.

But what's your response to the argument that at the very least if the jury is going to hear about the photographs and the sequence, that the failure to reveal all of the

documentation, you know, that proves what is essentially undisputed, which is the defendants' presence there restraining her, all of that, shouldn't be told to avoid confusion?

MR. THADANI: So I think it goes to just the fact that these are photographs of people. Okay? So in a criminal case if you're identifying who robbed you and you're looking at photographs, you can identify the person who robbed you. You don't also then need to see the surveillance video, their criminal history, everything about their -- all the evidence in the case. You don't need that to look at photographs. I'm looking at you, Your Honor, right now for the first time in person. If I see a photograph tomorrow, I'll say, oh, that's Judge Morrison, I remember her. I don't need to see anything else to do that.

So, first of all, they're photographs -- I believe plaintiff's counsel is using this as a way to get into evidence something that should not be in evidence. They haven't really explained, okay, we got this paperwork later, how did that affect the identification of looking at photographs and identifying who you allege did something to you? It doesn't. And again, the way -- if they want to remedy that by indicating that they didn't get certain documentation at that time, you didn't have the Hanrahan report, you didn't have the memo books, you didn't have this,

you didn't have that, they could do that. And that's a way to -- if they believe that's a proper argument to make with respect to the photograph identification, why it may not be as foolproof as it otherwise may have been, they can do that without raising the issue of sanctions being raised.

And again, I did raise this in the papers. The sanctions are against one of the five defendants that are remaining in the case. The City of New York, yes, is a defendant in the case. Obviously Your Honor is aware we have a motion in limine with respect to that issue. But without getting into that specific issue, the four individual defendants were not defendants in the case at the time. The stanchions were not asserted against them.

asserted in a trial that they're defendants in is unfairly prejudicial to them because they weren't involved, they weren't parties to that. And so that's another reason why reference of the sanctions -- first of all, it's unnecessary, because, again, they are photographs. This is not an allegation that we provided false photographs and then gave them the real photographs or we gave them photographs of when they were abules and then we gave them photographs of when they were adults. They're the same photographs. No new photographs came to light.

So again, I know plaintiff is raising this issue as

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a conclusory, well, we didn't get the stuff, it's sanction discovery misconduct, but how -- how did the viewing of photographs, how would it be different if we had more information. That frankly goes to her credibility. If we had known that Camhi was involved, we wouldn't have picked Camhi. That does go to her credibility. She's just picking the person who she can most clearly say was involved versus the person who actually did it. That's sort of the issue here. THE COURT: Thank you. I think I understand your argument. Let me just go back really quickly to Captain Hanrahan's investigation. What's your position on what time or do you have any information about when his investigation actually began? Was it the same day as her arrest or the day she was taken to the hospital? Was it shortly thereafter? MR. THADANI: I believe it was within 12 hours of when she was taken to the hospital.

THE COURT: Okay. And as I understand it, your argument for the reason why the date on the report, the incorrect date, which is six days before her arrest, is listed is because he was using a template from another case, an electronic template that he essentially pulled up on the screen and filled out, and that's why we see not just the same date, but also the same case number as the case that's not

43 1 about Ms. Martinez; is that right? 2 MR. THADANI: Correct. 3 THE COURT: Okay. But as far as we know, there is 4 no evidence that he showed Ms. Martinez any photographs of any 5 of the officers who were at the precinct that night at all? 6 MR. THADANI: No. 7 THE COURT: Okay. And we don't know why he didn't 8 do that other than if she was interviewed, she may have denied 9 that any officer caused her harm? 10 MR. THADANI: I mean, it would require a fair amount of speculation. But if I'm permitted to speculate, I would 11 12 state that, yes, I mean, based on the report that's there, it 13 says that she denied wrongdoing by members of service. 14 Understanding that's not what she's alleging in this lawsuit, 15 I understand that, but that's what the document indicates. 16 Now, in an alternate universe where instead what it 17 reflected was she identified wrongdoing and I don't know who 18 it was, there may have been a photo array procedure done. 19 That's done sometimes. I can't say for sure it would've been 20 I don't know. But it may have been. So if I'm done. 21 speculating as to why it didn't happen though, I think it's 22 because the report does not indicate that plaintiff was 23 asserting wrongdoing and couldn't identify who did it. It was 24 more that she denied it and that's the reason. 25 Right. Although, in some ways, isn't THE COURT:

that -- and I recognize with all your caveats that we are speculating because he's not here one would certainly think that an official investigation, just like he would document who he interviews, he would document if he showed her photographs.

And in some ways I think your last answer got back to my original concern, which is, if the question in this case really was the identities of the officers and her ability to perceive and recall their faces, that would've been something he would have looked into very early on as opposed to the issue which we're dealing with today, which is really the same issue he began to investigate, which is, were her undisputed injuries caused by some improper use of force, failure to provide her with timely medical care and/or failure to intervene or not and who's telling the truth, not who's accurately remembering faces?

MR. THADANI: I understand that, Your Honor.

However, again, just to reiterate the point we made is, I'm not saying that is the central issue in the case. It is not the central issue. Frankly, it is still an issue in the case because, again, plaintiff still hasn't identified who it is.

But I don't think it's the central issue in the case.

The central issue in the case is, which version of two different events really wins the day? But again, like, I think the fact that she's alleging this happened to her, the

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circumstances under which it happened to her, there's no masks, we're in a room with two people by myself, it's well lit, this is a traumatic, it's very serious allegations, my fingers are bent backwards, I'm put in chokehold, my feet are stepped on, my hair is pulled. The fact that she then describes them, what they look like, that's undisputed, I don't see any way that's not coming in, and looked at photographs, you know, understanding it's not immediately thereafter, but looked at photographs of individuals who were there at the precinct and identified certain people and, more importantly, precluded the people who are on the case now, it still speaks to her credibility just like, for instance, Laliberte allegedly, 13 months before this incident, may have given a false statement. It was unclear, but may have, by plaintiff's version of events, given a false statement with respect to an unrelated event, that goes to credibility.

This goes to credibility because it speaks specifically to her recollection of the events, what she is stating about the events and where this is really a credibility case about event A versus event B, it's a crucial part in assessing her credibility. And again, plaintiff's -- we didn't tell them to do this. In the JPTO, they listed two of the photographs and wrote by themselves -- we didn't tell them to do it. They wrote relevant to credibility. They wrote relevant to personal involvement. They did that.

THE COURT: I think I understand that as talking about the defendants' credibility, or are you saying that the photos are relevant to her credibility?

MR. HARVIS: No, Your Honor, we're talking about the defendants' credibility.

MR. THADANI: Their photographs are relevant to their credibility?

THE COURT: Let me ask this because Mr. Thadani raises a good point.

What, if anything, do you intend to offer with respect to photographic evidence if I grant your motion to preclude Ms. Martinez from being questioned about photos -- a full array of 36 photos that you would get in discovery?

MR. HARVIS: Yeah. We would have no -- as far as I'm concerned, I don't think we would have any use for any of the photographs if we did that. And again, I just want to say, I mean, you know, it's not like in every case it's some part of a preliminary process where the plaintiff is presented with photographs.

I mean what Judge Pollak was attempting to do was have Corporation Counsel identify these people. And the only reason that the photographs even entered the case was because they professed to the Court that they couldn't do that because there was no incident. Because the individual officers, whether they were defendants or not, concealed their

involvement. Officer Ryan, who was the arresting officer, went to CCRB and was asked, you know, 45 minutes of questions about what happened that night, and he never made one mention of Rosie Martinez. And he allegedly went into a room and she's punching a wall. And so that's the record that we had.

We had a record of him denying, you know, omitting that anything happened. None of the documents that would've showed us who did it, there wouldn't have been any photographs in this case if they had just done the investigation that the Court ordered them to do. And so as a result of them not doing that, they then created this situation where manufacturing and using and through invading attorney-client interactions and attempting to kind of read the tea leaves of what we wrote on pages in the docket, they're now going to cross-examine it on her and the jury's not going to hear the context in which that was going on. We think that that's really prejudicial and misleading, and so that's -- that's really what it comes down to.

MR. THADANI: Your Honor, if you don't mind, just because I have the JPTO in front of me, I just make a record here. On pages 20 and 21 on the JPTO, which is Docket 201, this is with respect to Exhibits 23 and 25, they wrote, quote, on Exhibit 23, Ryan's appearance -- and this is -- they listed his photograph, Ryan's appearance is relevant to personal involvement and plaintiff's credibility.

With respect to Exhibit 25 -- this was Digennaro's photograph -- defendants' appearance is relevant to personal involvement and plaintiff's credibility.

I just wanted to note that on --

MR. HARVIS: And they do both match the description that Ms. Martinez provided from the beginning. So I don't think that it doesn't -- I think that it supports her credibility to the extent that it's appropriate to admit it, but we think that it's going to go down a very misleading and problematic path for us to admit it.

THE COURT: Before we move on, because we have a lot to cover, let me ask the parties to just supplement if you can jointly -- and I hope this will be simpler than having you each do it. I'd just like to get a little more information as to the timing and the manner of when all of these 36 photographs were provided to the plaintiff through her counsel. And the timing of any response that the City submits is relevant, you're welcome to add, you know, anything you think. I just want to get a sense of the time that elapsed.

And to the extent -- I don't think you have it, but you have any additional information about when Captain Hanrahan's investigation began and ended. If not, you can just rely on the representations you made here today. I know we're trying to recreate something with a deceased witness and an incomplete file.

MR. THADANI: Just to clarify, because I'm not sure if I heard correctly. Did you want us to submit a joint letter with respect to the timeline?

THE COURT: Sure. Why don't you submit the letter as a proponent of the photographs.

MR. THADANI: Okay.

THE COURT: But please confer with your adversary to the extent Mr. Harvis and Ms. Fett any differing statements or accounts as to when those were provided to you.

MR. THADANI: I believe the docket is pretty clear.

I mean I think I can do that just based on citing to the docket. If I have questions, I'll certainly reach out to plaintiff's counsel.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let me just ask before we move on, Mr. Harvis, to respond briefly to the City's argument that there's some manifest unfairness in having the individual officers bear the brunt of any taint from the sanctions history in discovery violations since they were not individual defendants in the case with the understanding the City is still a defendant and that's a separate issue.

MR. HARVIS: Right. I mean I think it's a valid concern to keep in mind that although, for example, Ryan conceal his involvement and we do believe that that was directly proximately caused part of what happened, we think

that that could be dealt with through a jury instruction just saying that, you know, the individual defendants were not part of the case at that -- I don't think we should be getting into any of this, frankly. I think it's really confusing for the jury. But I think if we had to deal with it, we would say that the individual defendants were not a part of the case at that time, and the City of New York, you know, is the one that was responsible for complying with the Court's order, something like that.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. Thanks.

Speaking of jury instructions, I wanted to ask you now about plaintiff's motion for an adverse inference instruction to the jury about the prisoner pedigree form and the prisoner holding pen roster.

So I've reviewed your briefs and the relevant authorities and I know that the undisputed legal standard here, which I don't think either side disputes, is that the Court can grant an adverse inference for spoliation if and only if, first, the party who had control over the evidence had a duty to preserve it at the time it was destroyed, second, the evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind and, three, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence would have supported the movant's case.

I'm also aware with respect to the second prong, the culpable state of mind, there is some authority in this

circuit that was cited by Judge Kovner in her Lekomstev, L-E-K-O-M-S-T-E-V, decision that this state of mind can in some cases be established by evidence of negligence.

So here's my question for the City. My concern I have here is that the City, you know, as you pointed out when you were discussing the Hanrahan report, was I noticed very, very early on because there was a prisoner injured in custody, that this was an incident being investigated that there could well be a notice of claim filed, some civil liability resulting at the very least against the City even if they hadn't identified the officers at that juncture.

And so, you know, by your account, the investigation obviously didn't start six days before she was arrested, but started very soon after. And I realize at this point you can't fix the exact date, but certainly very soon. So why wasn't that investigation enough to trigger a real duty on the NYPD's part, the City's, to preserve these documents, the holding pen roster and pedigree form, and why wasn't there destruction or loss at the very least negligent?

MR. THADANI: So first response is, as I mentioned earlier, the investigation resulted in -- I understand the plaintiff is going to dispute the proprietary of it, but the investigation on its face closed with no allegation of wrongdoing. And so I don't know that that would necessarily trigger a duty to preserve.

THE COURT: Let me stop you right there.

So the investigation's conclusion obviously if it results in no allegation of wrongdoing, you know as counsel for the City, that certainly doesn't preclude lawsuits being filed. In fact, many cases the City has settled for substantial sums had initial internal investigations that resulted in findings of no liability on the part of the officers. And other cases the City's prevailed on at trial have resulted in initial findings of no liability or wrongdoing on the part of the officer.

So that does not -- once an investigation says we're not going to discipline an officer, that doesn't mean the City or the NYPD can start throwing away records.

MR. THADANI: Sure. I just want to make as a preliminary -- I guess I'm drawing -- this is not my lead point, but just to clarify.

THE COURT: Sure. And I asked you a very compound question.

MR. THADANI: My clarification just with respect to that is, yes, you're right, there are findings of unsubstantiated, exonerated, et cetera, leads to lawsuits. But in those cases plaintiff, the claimant, the individual, is still alleging wrongdoing even if there's no finding of wrongdoing.

My distinction was, the paperwork for that

investigation indicate that the plaintiff was indicating no wrongdoing by members of service and, therefore, to the extent that that is accurate, there really wouldn't be a thought that there's going to be a lawsuit if they've already talked to her and she's like, no, I'm not saying police did anything wrong.

Putting that aside, I think our argument with respect to the adverse inference is less about the duty to preserve. I think with respect to that it was more about the individual defendants not having a duty to preserve, understanding plaintiff's counsel made some arguments about filing, which is a little bit different. But our -- I mean, I think part of it -- like, to the extent there's a duty to preserve, I think the ques- -- our point would be more about the nature of the documents, what these documents are. Okay?

So the prisoner pedigree form is a document that is reflected basically verbatim into the command log. So the document, we don't have the document, can't find the document, the information is not lost to us.

THE COURT: Tell me why that's the case. Why is it always the case that's what's on the form is the same as what's in the command log? Why would they have two separate documents --

MR. THADANI: That is what witnesses have testified to and also what is the procedures in the patrol guide. And, moreover, I believe the function of this document -- I could

be wrong, and plaintiff's counsel can correct me certainly, their function for this document is, it indicates that plaintiff's physical condition was, quote, app normal, apparently normal, at the time she got to the precinct.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I lost a little bit.

Which document are we talking about, please? Same as the command log?

MR. THADANI: Sure. The prisoner pedigree form, there are questions that are asked about an individual's pedigree, their name, their date of birth, where they live, their physical condition, et cetera. That information is then transcribed into an arrest stamp that's contained within the command log that has that same information.

And I believe with respect to this document, plaintiff's position is the relevance of the prisoner pedigree card, which we don't have, is that it would have said apparently normal as her physical condition. However, the command log says that her condition was apparently normal. It is undisputed, we're not disputing, that her condition was reflected as apparently normal. And, therefore, the document itself is not really relevant to the issues in the case. Yes, we can't find it. That doesn't automatically mean, well, there's spoliation and adverse inference because we can't find every single document that may have some relevance in the case.

So I think with respect to that document, I think from our perspective, it's a really easy issue because the information that's being sought is reflected in other documents, one; and two, it's an undisputed issue that it relates to.

So what is the adverse inference? How would this have been unfavorable to us and unfavorable for her when the information is undisputed and it's already documented in other ways?

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to give plaintiff a chance to respond to that in a minute, but why don't you go on to your next point.

MR. THADANI: And then with respect to the holding pen roster, I believe the position they took in their papers is that it would indicate her physical condition; however, there -- I attached the document as an exhibit, there's no space for that. And I'm not sure exactly what their basis for that is.

What it does indicate is who is being held and when checks are being made on them. So generally if you check on a prisoner every 30 minutes, 15 minutes, you have to put the time you check that individual. So the prisoner pen roster that I cite as an exhibit relates to another individual who was arrested along with plaintiff and indicates those times.

THE COURT: So is it your understanding that if an

officer is filling out the holding pen roster, they only put in the checks, but there's no substantive information? So even if they went in and the person had had a heart attack or passed out, they wouldn't put that on the roster at all? They'd just say checked at 10:42 a.m.?

MR. THADANI: No, I'm not saying that. I tried to address that in our papers too. There's like two prong. There's a remark section, so you can put comments. It's not necessarily physical condition per se. But in the scenario Your Honor provides, it's possible. I don't know that that's where it necessarily would be documented versus somewhere else, but it may be, so I don't know want to discount that.

But really the function of the document is once she's there, that's undisputed. Right? Then it's when is she being checked on, that's two. And then three, this remarks section with respect to Danny Rivera, who was the other individual that was arrested, all it said was he was taken to Queens central booking.

THE COURT: Right. And if I understand your argument, you're saying that essentially there's nothing to instruct the jury adversely on because there's no basis to believe that the document in any way would have contradicted, in fact, it would've supported the officer's account that they were coming as many times as they said, 17 or however many times they checked on her; and, in fact, under remarks they

could well have said, you know, she's kicking the wall, punching the wall, all the things that they alleged her to have done?

MR. THADANI: That may be there. I think that would refute a lot of plaintiff's argument in the case. I don't know. With respect to what they think might've been there, which it could have said, you know, injured hand, has to go to the hospital, there's no real reason to think that because they questioned the individual who is responsible for the document and his testimony was he didn't think she needed medical attention, he didn't observe injuries on her.

So yes, we don't have the document. This is a situation. We don't have the document. There's no dispute about that. But just because you don't have every single document does not lead to an adverse inference. Because I don't think there's the showing here that an adverse inference is warranted with respect to this document given what we know would have said/even what it does say.

THE COURT: Let me stop you right there. Let me ask plaintiff's counsel to address specifically this third prong of the required findings.

What basis do you have from which a reasonable trier of fact, meaning the jury, could find that the evidence would have or could have supported -- sorry, excuse me, would have supported your case on exactly what issues?

MR. HARVIS: So just to step back for a second. So what happens is, she's arrested in the evening. There's -- whatever happens overnight happens. She's either hurt or she hurts herself in their story. And then, you know, these hours pass from when the incident happens at 12:30 until I think like 5:45 in the morning. And then no ambulance is ever called. She's taken to go to central booking along with Danny Rivera.

And Danny Rivera's testimony is that, you know, all along she's screaming and crying, they're both demanding that she have medical treatment, nobody is doing anything for them. And then it's only when she gets to central booking and the screener realizes that she's injured, that she goes to the hospital. And then when Camhi calls internal affairs to first report this, the first time it's ever reported, it's after she's already been checked out medically and they've already confirmed that, you know, she doesn't have any broken bones or whatever. And so -- and then Camhi tells the internal affairs investigator that she's good, but, you know, she's being released from the hospital and she's going to go back to central booking. But she doesn't go back to central booking. She gets brought back to the precinct. And she's kept there basically all day.

And so nobody has any explanation for why that happened or really any recollection of it happening. And so

it leaves a lot of questions, you know, that we don't have any basis to answer that would potentially be answered by this roster about, you know, after she's injured, who's checking on her? They're saying they're checking on her. Is that testimony true? When Ryan says he checks on her 19 times, is this a document that's going to show that that's, you know, consistent with the documentation or it's refuted by the documentation? Of course we don't know what the remarks say. But whenever there's spoliation, you never know what the document is going to say.

And the Second Circuit has said that the person who is dealing with a lost document can't be held to too strict a standard because we're all speculating about what this document shows. And the reason -- Your Honor was exactly right. As soon as someone was injured in their custody, the responsible thing for the municipality to do is to collect all the documents and then figure it out later, whether it's a valid -- you know, a valid issue or not. And so --

THE COURT: And I don't hear the City disputing you on the duty to preserve part. I think they've -- correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Thadani, but essentially conceded that there was some duty on the City's part, if not the individual defendants' part, to preserve these documents.

I think the concern that they have raised, which I'd like you to address, is that even if you cannot say with any

certainty what these documents would have shown, what are you actually have beyond pure speculation that there would've been something helpful to your case in those documents that would really justify this pretty extraordinary remedy of an adverse inference?

MR. HARVIS: Sure. Well, I mean, we know -- just by their very design, we know that the prisoner pedigree form is designed to capture her physical condition, which is like the most important issue in dispute. And sure, we can assume it's identical to the command log, but that's nothing but an assumption. And on these facts we think we have the right to assume that it may have said something different. Or even if it did say the same thing, it would be another data point for plaintiff to point to and say, look, how many different times they wrote down that she didn't have any physical injury; it was both the guy who did the pedigree form and the guy who did the command log, they both had a chance to look at her. I actually think, of the two, the roster is the more probative, the more likely to contain important information.

Because, again, there's been specific testimony about how often she was checked on, and we think that goes to both the veracity of that testimony and the officer's credibility because, you know, it just -- it really raised a lot of questions for us that they could check on her 19 times after restraining her and not call her an ambulance. And we

just think that that document would provide a lot of insight into both that question and also, you know, where she was held and why she was brought back to the precinct after being taken to the hospital.

MR. THADANI: If I may briefly.

So none of that goes to how the document is helpful for them. So the undisputed facts are, she came in apparently normal. That is good for them. And that's -- and we're fine with that. Again, the allegation is something happened at the precinct. Whether it's caused by her or by the officers is the disputed fact. There's nothing that would've been favorable to warrant an adverse inference in the pedigree document. That's one.

Two, with respect to the prisoner roster form, the roster, to the extent it has times that being checked on, Ryan putting times that he checked on her is not favorable to them. There's nothing in the document that would be favorable to them. If they want to cross-examine, they can -- there's a remedy here. The cross-examination could be you're claiming -- and this only would be relevant to the deliberate difference claim, but you're claiming you checked on her every 30 minutes. Do you have -- you have no documentation to prove that you did that.

THE COURT: So let me ask you this. What are you intending to argue that the jury could find that would or may

have been favorable to your client? Not something that supports -- I understand his point as being, if your contention is they would've put fraudulent or fake information in the pedigree form, that's something for which you would impeach them.

But if you had the document, your case would be even stronger rather than presuming, you know, that there was something in there. I mean, what are you intending to argue that would justify this instruction the document would've shown if preserved.

MR. HARVIS: Because what it would've shown is that he wasn't truthful when he testified that he checked on her 19 times. That's what we think it could have shown. You didn't check on her at all.

THE COURT: Because your contention is that I checked on her 19 times was a belated fabrication, and that the form itself would have not reflected the frequency of those checks?

MR. HARVIS: Yeah. It either would've shown that he didn't check on her at all, that there were remarks that further undercut his testimony, or that he didn't check on her as many times as he said. You know, again, we're in a difficult position. We're the ones without the documents, so we're just trying to figure out what it might have said.

MR. THADANI: Your Honor, one last thing. I don't

believe the case law allows that sort of inference on such a speculative suggestion. There has to be something more in the record. There was questioning about it. We have the other document, by the way, that, again, I -- the issue is not the document; it's the second page. So we have the document. The second page is lost. And --

THE COURT: What's on the first page? Cover form?

MR. THADANI: The first page includes Danny Rivera's time in detention, includes the times he was checked on. And it's the second page -- presumably this would not have been an issue if the page didn't run out, but it goes to the second page. Rosie Martinez, presumably, is on the top the page.

THE COURT: And there's no dispute, I take it, that the jury is going to be told that the second page regarding Rosie Martinez is lost and cannot be located, right? The question is just whether they get an instruction that they may presume something about the circumstances of its loss or presume something adverse to defendants, because they're going to be told that that document is missing and is not available to them?

MR. THADANI: I mean, I don't know that that's an issue right now. I mean, I think our view would be that the fact -- I mean, look, I understand they're going to make a different argument. Our view would be that the fact that this document in itself wasn't located or wasn't found is not

relevant to the issues to be determined at trial. So I don't know that the jury is necessarily going to be informed of that. Like to the extent we're -- our argument right now is with respect to the adverse inference, we don't think the showing has been made. But separately as to whether the jury should be informed that out of over the 10,000 of pages of documents produced in this case were two pages not produced. I'm not sure that's something we believe the jury needs to necessarily know, well, this page wasn't produced, this page wasn't produced.

However, to the extent they ask -- questioning, again, I think that's entirely proper if Detective Ryan testifies, I checked on her every 30 minutes and they ask him, you don't have any document that supports that you did that, I think that's fair, fair game, and I think that would be, you know, something a jury would hear and there wouldn't be any documentation supporting that. They have to take his word or not.

THE COURT: And why couldn't we simply avoid the adverse inference instruction problem by simply telling the jury that the City's searched for and has been unable to find that document and they were able to find it for Mr. Rivera and not for Ms. Martinez without telling the jury what they could or should find as a result of it?

MR. THADANI: It could. It could.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THADANI: Your Honor, I don't know that

Danny Rivera's document really -- I don't know. I guess I don't think they've listed it as an exhibit. I could be wrong.

MR. HARVIS: Can I just say one other thing,

Your Honor, which is that -- you know, we talk about the

Hanrahan report. Another thing that's important to remember

about the Hanrahan report is that, according to Hanrahan, both

Ryan and Camhi told Hanrahan that the incident where

Ms. Martinez had to be restrained took place in the holding

pen cells, which is a totally separate area of the precinct

from the juvenile room where she was held.

So, you know, I know we're going to discuss the Hanrahan report, but I just -- you know, it's also probative of the question of, if Ryan was checking on her 19 times in a juvenile room, I think that that affects the credibility of him telling Hanrahan that actually this took place on the other side of the precinct in the holding pen cells.

THE COURT: Understood.

So let's talk about the Hanrahan report.

Coincidentally that was next on my list.

So I have a question for plaintiff's counsel. I mean, I am concerned about this exhibit, that your purpose in admitting it is to prove some kind of broader coverup at the

NYPD about this incident. But the claims that essentially the constitutional claims that related most closely to or for which that evidence could arguably be relevant, supervisory liability, denial of access to courts, those were all dismissed by Judge Kovner.

So under what current claim that's going to go to the jury is this report relevant and why is that the case?

MR. HARVIS: Well, the report contains admissions of these defendants that are not hearsay and reflect their statements that are inaccurate about where this happened given according -- well, we're going to find out from defense counsel when this report was prepared. I'm excited to find out. But whenever it was is presumably shortly --

THE COURT: Well, to be fair, I think he's been very candid that he doesn't -- he doesn't know and he's putting it together based on inferences that we're all working with based on a date listed that everyone concedes is the incorrect date and the time in which these investigations would've typically started, so...

MR. HARVIS: Fair enough.

THE COURT: So I know that the issue of the data is one that we'd have to consider, if the report comes in, whether it gets redacted, what the jury's told.

But putting that aside, what is there that is in the report specifically that you couldn't otherwise get admitted

by cross-examining the defendants about their statements? Why does the report itself have to come in as opposed to simply asking the officer defendants, you were interviewed by a captain about this incident and you said X? Why couldn't it simply come in through cross? Why do they have to seal the report? Because it's hearsay from a lot of people and an author who isn't here.

MR. HARVIS: Well, I don't think it's hearsay because I think it's a business record where the officer was an under an obligation to make accurate entries in this report. And it really -- all the substance of it is admissions against people who are adverse parties in this case. So I don't see there being any hearsay, real valid hearsay concern there.

And then I just think it's tremendously relevant because this business record documents the first statements that the officers made regarding this event, and they are broadly inaccurate in ways that Judge Pollak has recognized in her decision awarding sanctions. And I think it's really not in dispute. And so I guess, you know, relevant evidence is admissible and it's not hearsay. And so I think the question should be, why wouldn't it be admitted in our view because it's a core relevant document. It's a first business record to document, you know, how the NYPD was looking at this.

And in our view, you know, we're not going to argue

any dismissed claims or try to get liability on any dismissed claims. But the fact that the officers took acts of concealment and misled investigators about what happened here is, in our view, strong circumstantial evidence to support the claims that are being tried. The reason why you lie about it is because you committed excessive force. The reason why you lie about it is because you should have gotten, you know, an ambulance for her. The reason why you go to the hospital and put wrong information in her medical records is because you're trying to create a smoke screen of a narrative that's going to avoid scrutiny of your conduct and avoid you being found out. I think that's, you know, the quintessential reason why people do things like that.

And I think if we're prohibited from being able to argue that inference, I think that that -- I think that would be unfair because I think it's strong evidence that supports the claims that are going to the jury.

THE COURT: So let me stop you there and ask the City. What's your response to Mr. Harvis's argument that this is -- the report itself should come in as a standalone document, as a business record, and specifically because it contains admissions by the individual defendants?

MR. THADANI: Okay. Just to clarify the record really quickly. It's not the first record about this. There was a phone call by Lieutenant Camhi that also clarifies the

discrepancies in the report that Mr. Harvis is so excited about. But it's not the first record. There were other records first.

With respect to the document, just to clarify initial point, we didn't actually move to preclude the document. We're moving to preclude the date and time error in the document which indicates that the interviews occurred six days beforehand. I think it is -- look, there's an issue with respect to the fact that the author of the document is deceased, obviously, right?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. THADANI: And there are issues in the document that can't be explained because he's deceased. I think there are issues with that. I don't think that necessarily makes it not a business record. I think it is. I don't think it's not relevant. I don't know whether the questioning can occur without the document. Whether the document itself needs to be in front of the jury, I'm not so sure. However, that's not what our motion was. Not to say we're waiving the right to raise that objection at the appropriate time, but we did not move in limine with respect to that, so I just want to make sure that's clear.

THE COURT: I mean, I would just say on that point, you know, you have the right to raise an objection at any point, but I would say, in part, because of the complicated

history on this case, in part, because he is deceased, I would really like to try to resolve any questions about what parts of his report do or do not come in, the dates, the conclusions, the statements as far in advance of trial as we can.

MR. THADANI: Sure.

THE COURT: So I'd ask you just now to tell me what you anticipate objecting to and why. It sounds like where you are is, you don't have a problem with the report itself coming in as long as the date itself is redacted or as long as, what, you're permitted to make some kind of argument or introduce the contrary exhibit about the other case to explain the date without your witness here, the author?

MR. THADANI: Sure. Yes. Okay. So I think right now what I can say is, our motion in limine was just very narrow with respect to that error. I think that I was a little bit surprised but also not surprised that there was an opposition with respect to just that, just the redacting the document. We didn't move to preclude. I know what I said about waiver. I would say Your Honor -- if Your Honor has already ordered us to provide a letter with respect to a couple of issues, I think if Your Honor doesn't mind I just want to consider whether we have an objection with respect to other aspects of the report and indicate that in that letter.

However, as of now, I don't believe so. I think the

issue is literally as narrow as I think it's just this bunch of a portion, like a very small portion in the top corner of the second page of the document, that has the wrong date and the wrong time because it's -- one, it's obvious. Forget about whether there's another IAB report that proves it.

Let's just put aside for a second. It's nonsensical that six days before they interviewed about this incident. It's obvious that that's an error. We just don't have the individual here to explain it.

And plaintiff's counsel asserted in their motion papers the parties should be free to argue whatever they want with respect to that date and time error. And I think that's highly problematic because it's a distraction from the issues to be decided in the case. It's much simpler just to redact that portion that's a mistake instead of having potentially a mini trial, we're going to enter a document related to some other individual who had an incident at the precinct six days before that the jury is going to see to see, okay, well, the number, the IAB code number is the same as the IAB code number here, and so it must've been, like, that he used a template, which is what I was surmising in the motion. I don't know that for a fact. But that's the -- I don't want to say it's the necessary inference, but it's sort of the most likely.

THE COURT: I thought you made a very strong argument in your papers. It was among the many complicated

issues I was presented with. That one actually seemed pretty straightforward. A lot of us are familiar with the electronic template that explains the error.

And I guess my question for you is, if a report is coming in which among other things has a conclusion from someone who is deceased who can't explain the error but also can't be cross-examined about the basis for his conclusion that these defendants committed no misconduct and further, and probably most troublingly, states as fact that Ms. Martinez made certain statements that she not only denies making, but actually maintains that that interview never took place, that she was never given an opportunity internally to report what happened or asked to give her side of the story, how is it that the one piece of information on which the jury might find Captain Hanrahan's care, diligence, even potentially truthfulness, you know, gets redacted, but all the rest of it, including Ms. Martinez's statements, comes in?

MR. THADANI: I think there's a difference between using the template document and writing in new information than it is about what I guess they would allege is fabrications. They're also the ones seeking to admit the document as opposed to us, at least at this stage. They're the ones affirmatively trying to use the document. I assume they have a theory or questioning to sort of cast doubt as to specific aspects. They've indicated as much, that there's

inconsistencies with respect to what Ryan and Camhi are saying where certain events occurred. I think there's a sloppy -- it's a sloppy report. Okay? Just frankly. He's not here to explain it, but the fact that that date is there, the fact that the descriptions are what are they are given we have other contemporaneous records that indicate that's not what they were saying, it's a sloppy record.

But I don't think that's a reason to permit -- it's a minor issue I think with respect to whether this should be redacted or not, but it's a distraction. And it's clearly erroneous. And I don't think it's necessary for defense or for the Court to spend time introducing irrelevant documents to prove or demonstrate or explain because the jury may be like, why is the date six days before? It's not the date of the report, by the way; it's the date of the interviews.

THE COURT: I understand. My concern as well or sort of broader is, you know, I don't know that we're going to get past hearsay threshold with this report because everybody agrees there's all kinds of indicia of unreliability. You might differ on what they are. You're saying there's a time and date error and a case number error. They're saying there's a whole interview that didn't happen. I'm not saying that certain statements couldn't come in, but it -- you know, there are some broader issues with it. Not to mention the entire history of what happened in discovery and what the jury

hears about that, you know, still considering it.

But I guess I'd just ask plaintiff, so for what purpose do you actually need the report? And, you know, the trial strategy is yours, but given that Ms. Martinez is alleged to have made all of these admissions of her own that this event never happened and she was never harmed in custody, what purpose or what relevancy does this have to your case in chief?

MR. HARVIS: Well, it really just shows that the -according to the defendants, you know, they provided
contradictory statements about where this event took place and
what it consisted of on the same day that, you know,
Ms. Martinez was injured. So it's an immediate
contemporaneous inaccurate account of, you know, key parts of
the event.

THE COURT: And it's your concern that if you just simply cross-examine them and ask them, didn't you say this to your captain when you were interviewed on this date and they deny it, that you should be able to offer it as some sort of business record impeachment or some other thing? Why do you need to offer it up front as opposed to simply asking him on the stand and presuming -- I assume we're not going disavow those statements or have they already?

MR. HARVIS: That's a good question. I don't recall what their deposition testimony was on whether or not they

disavowed the statements. But I guess the fact that the City's investigation of this when it first happened was that they say they conducted an interview of Ms. Martinez that they didn't really conduct in which they say that she said that she didn't make any complaints even though we have all this other contemporaneous evidence that she was making complaints, both from Danny Rivera, from the notice of claim, the 50-H. I mean, right then it wasn't like there was some late made, you know, allegations.

And so the fact that the City conducted that kind of investigation at the beginning, this self-serving investigation where they categorize it as no allegation being made, put down it happening in the wrong place, we think all of that goes to the overall reasonableness of the defendants and how they treated Ms. Martinez and her allegations. And we think it's relevant for the jury to hear about it.

MR. THADANI: Your Honor, if I may briefly. The report is not created by the defendants though. So this is going to be a situation where this is a report they've never seen. So that's the theory is that this shows some kind of wrongdoing on behalf of the defendants. The defendants didn't create the document. They didn't review the document beforehand. They didn't confirm. It's not like I testified at a deposition and you review it and make sure the testimony is accurate and prepare an errata sheet. This is the document

76 that exists, but they didn't prepare it and they didn't get a 1 2 chance to correct it. I just wanted to note that. 3 MR. HARVIS: It's the City's employee, Hanrahan, so 4 we do have state law claims. So the fact that -- you know, I 5 don't think it's inappropriate for the jury to consider 6 what --7 THE COURT: Well, but the state law claim is only 8 about responding at superior on excessive force on assault and 9 battery, right? Essentially the state law version of 10 excessive force in which Hanrahan is not an individual 11 defendant. 12 MR. HARVIS: That is true. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Let me just ask one more quick 14 question about the procedural history. Was this argument that you made about the issue with 15 16 the date, meaning the explanation being that it came as a 17 template from another case, something that was raised before 18 Judge Pollak when she was considering sanctions? 19 MR. THADANI: I don't think so. 20 THE COURT: If you could check on that, I would 21 appreciate it. I'm asking because while I found some 22 plausibility to your argument that that may explain the date 23 discrepancy, I'm a bit concerned that there was a factual

finding and essentially a legal finding that this was

significant in the history of the case and it goes to the

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77 reliability of certain evidence, the potential usefulness to 1 2 the plaintiff that Magistrate Judge Pollak made that was then 3 adopted by Judge Donnelly and Judge Kovner that I'm not 4 empowered to disturb by saying, you know, I see this 5 differently so I'm just going to redact it. MR. THADANI: I'm happy to put in writing I can 6 7 confirm it. The reason why I can confirm it is because I 8 wasn't able to figure it out until I got the document from the 9 other case and that was well after that. I can confirm that. 10 THE COURT: Well after the sanctions? MR. THADANI: Well after the sanctions order. So I 11 12 could not have briefed it because I didn't know it to say it. 13 I only realized the template issue when I figured out there 14 was another IAB investigation or another internal 15 investigation with the same sort of code name numbers relating 16 to another case that happened to be on the date and time that 17 is error. And again, that was much later in the case. I can 18 confirm that in writing, but I can confirm that to you now. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 20 Okay. It is 4:05. Why don't we take a five-minute 21 break and then come back. Sounds good. So we'll be back on 22 the record at 4:10. Thank you. 23 (Recess taken.) THE COURT: We're back on the record. 24 Next I wanted to turn to the defendants' motion to 25

preclude allegations of the individual defendants' alleged other misconduct. I think I've now narrowed this down to two areas of inquiry that the City is asking me to exclude. One is any inquiry or evidence as to this alleged undercount of the amount of heroin found in plaintiff's apartment. And the second is Officer Digennaro's failure to properly complete an entry in his memo book concerning the search of plaintiff's apartment.

Am I right, that there's no other incidents other than Laliberte's issue with the arrestee in 2013?

MR. THADANI: I don't think I can answer that question because I tried my best to surmise what they might do. And so yes, those three, as Your Honor has mentioned, those two in Laliberte, I specifically identified I have a catch-all towards the end, anything else. It seemed like they weren't really -- plaintiff wasn't pushing anything else. So I believe the answer is yes, but I think that question is actually for them to say if they have something else they want to offer that I don't know about.

THE COURT: Plaintiff?

MR. HARVIS: Is there anything else that we're going to be crossing these defendants about besides --

THE COURT: Specific incidents of misconduct extrinsic to the incident involving Ms. Martinez other than the two I just mentioned and the 2013 incident involving

Sergeant Laliberte.

MR. HARVIS: It's hard for me to say because I can't -- I mean, are there other -- is a specific incident of misconduct when they, like, lied at their deposition? Like, for example, Digennaro initially testified at his first deposition that there were buy reports showing that Rosie Martinez had specific knowledge that Danny Rivera was dealing drugs out of her apartment. And then he came back for a second deposition and disavowed all that and started saying how that was wrong, that was a mistake. I mean he lied.

THE COURT: I'm not talking about that type. I understand inconsistencies in testimony and cross-examination about both the incident itself involving Ms. Martinez and any testimony or statements they've given about it.

I'm talking about extrinsic events happening either prior to or after this event involving unrelated citizens, defendants, that sort of thing.

MR. HARVIS: I understand. Okay.

So then I would say the answer to that question -hold on one second. I mean, I think -- Your Honor, I think
that there was an incident where Digennaro had a prior
finding -- finding of perjury, either perjury investigation or
perjury finding. And so I just -- I don't -- I'm not familiar
enough with the facts right now to just even give the full
explanation of what it was, but I just want to flag that

80 because I do think that may be one additional -- do you want 1 2 to jump in on that? 3 MR. THADANI: You're thinking of Forgione. 4 MR. HARVIS: Thank you. Then no. The answer is no. 5 THE COURT: Let's talk about the other two. I have 6 7 a preliminary factual question about this alleged undercount 8 of the heroin. I saw, I think in the briefing, it was alleged 9 that the undercount was by a single envelope, that there were 10 286 actually recovered, but he was alleged to have written or 11 he did write in his report that there were 285 or that was 12 both Officers Ryan and Digennaro. But then in Pollini's 13 expert report, he made some mention of lab documents saying it 14 was 285 versus 290 that was actually recovered. 15 Does anyone know what the actual amount recovered 16 versus the undercount actually is? 17 That's a good question. I think there MR. HARVIS: 18 might be a discrepancy in the record about -- I think that in 19 one part of the record, it may say 290 versus 285, and in one 20 it may be 286 versus 287. That's my understanding. 21 MR. THADANI: I believe it's one. And I would -- I 22 don't think I would've put that in if I didn't believe that 23 was accurate. I think it is. It may be that there's another 24 record that references 290. But I believe there was an 25 investigation into this as well and paperwork created as a

result of that, and I believe that in that paperwork the discrepancy is a one.

THE COURT: And I take it the City's position is, whether it's one or five, given the total amount, that that's sufficiently minor or sufficiently due to error rather than malfeasance that's it's not relevant to his credibility in this case.

MR. THADANI: Yes. I think our position -- and again, it is an overarching point about most of our motions in limine is sort of trying to focus the case on what the case is about and try to screen the distractions. I think this is a primary example of one of many and is another one, you know, not necessarily I somewhat surprised that they opposed it. It's an undercounting. In theory it's beneficial for the plaintiff who is being charged with the drugs that there was an undercounting of the drugs.

But in any event, it's a mistake. I think it's easily explainable. This is something we're going to spend trial time on. I don't know that there's any jury that's going to, well, undercounting -- I mean, I don't have a photograph of it, I was looking at it today actually. They're, like, very tiny envelopes, like, smaller than these, like, one of these, like, Post-it flags, that's how small they are, and you're counting 300 of them in the middle of the night, it's not crazy to undercount by one.

Should they have been more careful? Probably. But, you know, to state that it goes to their credibility and their truthfulness I think is a huge leap.

THE COURT: Right. Your position is a mistake versus a lie, that those are two different things, and that that really doesn't go to their credibility but --

MR. THADANI: It would be different if it was, well, we found cocaine, we found heroin or we found \$2,000 or \$20,000. It's not even necessarily the magnitude per se, but the nature of the discrepancy at issue here, it's an undercounting of one.

THE COURT: So do defendants plan to offer any evidence through the officer's testimony for questioning

Ms. Martinez about the amount of heroin that was recovered in her apartment that -- as a result of the search?

MR. THADANI: I'm not sure. Possibly. I mean, maybe not with a specific number. I mean if there was a specific number, I would imagine is probably is subject to cross to say, well, you miscounted the numbers. So possibly.

THE COURT: So if the number comes in, then the undercount is fair game?

MR. THADANI: I think it can be, you know, it can be -- you know, for instance, if we had did something like over X number, 250 over 270, I don't know that that necessarily brings in a discrepancy versus saying it's 286

exactly.

THE COURT: Why is that?

MR. THADANI: Because the discrepancy is -- I probably have to think about it a little bit more, but I think there's a difference probably between, like, over 250 versus exactly 285. Well, actually, when you counted, you thought it was -- actually, you know, I want to walk it back a little bit because I'm not so sure that -- you know, whether that evidence is presented or not -- let me take another step back.

Because I think there's a difference between the fact and the discipline. Okay? So I think to the extent they're trying -- and I think this relates to the other motion too. To the extent they're trying to elicit a fact that he undercounted or a fact that certain information was not in a memo book, I don't know that that -- that wasn't really our motion.

Our motion was -- and I think maybe they've agreed, but I'll let Mr. Harvis speak on it. Our focus with this was the discipline that resulted from it and the investigation into the allegations. That's sort of what our motion was about, not to preclude questioning about you were investigated with respect to undercounting, there was a substantiation, here's what your discipline was, et cetera, if there was one, same thing with the memo book.

THE COURT: Just so I know the history, because I

obviously missed the mark on what I thought the motion was about, there was an investigation and it was substantiated that he undercounted?

MR. THADANI: It was. It was.

THE COURT: And what was the discipline that he received?

MR. THADANI: I think it was like a retraining, but I'm not 100 percent on that. I believe it was something to the effect, like formal training, something like that, but not 100 percent sure.

But that is sort of where our motion was targeted on is more the discipline and the investigation. I think -- again, I could be wrong -- plaintiff's counsel did not push on that so much as push on the fact. I'm not so sure we have an issue with the fact per se.

Similarly, like with the memo, I know we haven't gone to the memo, but to the extent they want to question witnesses, I expect that they will, you didn't put -- what I anticipate, I don't think this is revealing much, because they're going to ask every witness, you didn't put in your memo book that you observed Rosie Martinez punching the wall and kicking the cabinets. I mean, that's not where we're moving to preclude. We're moving to preclude --

THE COURT: Let me ask plaintiff's counsel then.
What is the relevance of the undercount? They're

not disputing that it happened, that he off by either one or five envelopes. What, if anything, is the relevance of the undercount? And do you have any problem with them; A, introducing evidence or testimony that heroin was recovered in the apartment as sort of part of the series of events of why she was brought in for questioning to begin with; and if that's not an issue, do you have a problem with them saying it was over 200, 250, 285, whatever the number is?

MR. HARVIS: Well, I think that on our theory of the case, it has come in before the jury that there were drugs founds in the apartment because that's why they were trying to get information from --

THE COURT: I assumed so, but I never like to assume what any party or parties are agreeing on or think is relevant. So I'm glad we're all in agreement that that's at least part of the narrative. The jury will be told some heroin was recovered. And now the question is, will they be told an amount? And if so, is everybody in agreement that if the amount is told -- first, should the jury be told an amount? Second, if the amount is told, should they be told that there's no dispute that there was an undercount and told through -- I'll assume he'll admit it in his testimony if he's asked about it? And then I guess third, are you seeking to actually ask him about or introduce evidence that there was an investigation and he was disciplined for it? And if so, why?

MR. HARVIS: So I think the number should come in.

I think the miscount should come in for really the same reason. They're both facts of what happened. And no one's disputing the fact that there's a miscount. I think it's an undisputed fact that he, in the performance of his official duties, made a mistake. They can argue it's a minor mistake. If I'm the person to be accused of a drug crime, how much drugs I have is not minor to me. I think it's important.

And it also just bears noting that Digennaro, who's a supervisor for Ryan, was also cited -- independent of what comes before the jury, he was also investigated, he had a responsibility to review the count. He also failed to do that properly.

So I'm just saying if we're talking about what testimony will be elicited from these witnesses, I think it's a fair minor point of discussion with both of them that, you know, yes, there were this many numbers, but you got it wrong and you were the supervisor and you got it wrong.

We're not seeking to offer the fact of their discipline. We don't believe that's relevant unless they open the door. But on the our case in chief, we don't there's any independent relevance to the fact that they were disciplined. So I think that answers the question.

THE COURT: Okay. So it sounds like we may not have a dispute.

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              MR. THADANI: I think so.
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              THE COURT: Fantastic.
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              MR. HARVIS: One down. 25 to go.
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              THE COURT: 15 or so more to go. All right.
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              So let's turn now to something on which I suspect we
    will probably still have a dispute, but I guess we'll see,
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    plaintiff's motion to preclude evidence of her February 2019
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    dispute with her neighbor or, as I saw on the video,
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    neighbors, it looks like there were two of them, in her
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    subsequent arrest.
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              So I think what may not be disputed is that
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    defendants may seek to either offer or ask plaintiff about the
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    March 1st hospital records that relate to this event where she
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    was taken to the hospital and I think by the officers after
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    she was arrested and given some medical treatment. And
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    according to Mr. Thadani's letter, plaintiff is not objecting
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    to the records coming in, I think, provided that any reference
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    to the arrest in plaintiff's view is redacted from those
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    records. Is that correct?
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              MR. HARVIS: Yeah, subject to -- assuming they're
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    relevant, yes.
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              THE COURT: Yes, okay. So we'll deal with any
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    relevancy, but no other objections.
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              So I have a couple of threshold factual questions
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    for the parties about this incident.
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Mr. Harvis, was Ms. Martinez ever charged with assault or any other crime in connection with this incident? And if she was, what was the result?

MR. HARVIS: It's not in the record, Your Honor. I don't know the answer to that. I believe that she was charged, and I believe that the charges were dismissed. But that's really just not much more than my understanding. I don't have any documents and it's not in the record.

THE COURT: Okay. Does the City know the answer to that? Was there a conviction?

MR. THADANI: I don't believe there was a conviction.

THE COURT: Okay. So no conviction.

And so I think I now understand, thanks in part to the supplemental letter, the purpose and the scope, but let me just see if I have this right.

You're seeking to ask her about this incident, about the allegations the neighbor made against her, and you think it's important and relevant for her to be asked or the jury to hear that she was arrested, because during the course of the arrest, her hands were put into cuffs and she didn't complain of any pain when she was being cuffed and she didn't complain of any wrist or hand pain when she was in the hospital later; is that right? It's really just for damages in terms of the extent of the injury?

MR. THADANI: Yeah, it is right. And I think the timeline here is really important. So it's not so much that she was arrested, but I understand it's, like, interwind, right? So there's no escaping it. I understand that.

But the key to the handcuffs, to us, it's a crucial fact in this case given the timeline because -- and there's actually -- I didn't brief this, I saw this afterwards, but there's a minute entry on the docket that supports this on February 14th of 2019. And so that means this conference, it occurred before Magistrate Judge Pollak two weeks before this arrest. Surgery likely set for March. So she was just about to get surgery on her wrist. Two weeks before this incident, she was about to get surgery. So now you're talking about two weeks later she is -- and I don't know if Your Honor has seen the video.

THE COURT: I have.

MR. THADANI: But she's handcuffed -- she's told she's handcuffed for a number of minutes. Doesn't say anything about I can't be cuffed, cuff me in a certain way, my wrist hurts, I have a wrist injury, be careful, anything like that. The handcuffs are put on. Nothing about, ow, my wrist hurts. No grimacing pain. Nothing about, I'm about to have surgery, please, if you have to handcuff me, can you handcuff me a certain way? Do I have to be restrained this way? And then nothing thereafter.

And then the fact -- obviously Your Honor has spoken to the medical records. And the fact that then after being handcuffed for a period of time she goes to the hospital, no complaints about her wrists. After being handcuffed on the wrist she's apparently about to have surgery on, she ends up having the surgery in November of 2019, I believe, because this arrest delayed it. I don't think I'm speculating. Plaintiff's counsel informed me of that during discovery. And so the time period really makes this pertinent.

It's not -- I understand there's a big difference between this event happens in 2015 and this happens in 2019. That I understand. I think normally that would be a very persuasive argument but for the fact that she's just about to have surgery on her wrist and her wrist gets handcuffed and she doesn't say anything.

THE COURT: Right. But doesn't -- I mean, I don't know, I'm not medical doctor, but surgery can be for a lot of reasons, including to restore range of motion, function, that sort of thing. It doesn't -- surgery four years after an incident isn't always necessarily for the treatment of pain, and I think we're going to hear that from her treating physician and from the experts in this case.

MR. THADANI: That is true, Your Honor. I think if that was the case, that would also be a persuasive argument.

But the records clearly bare out that the pain is a major

I need to have surgery because I've been waiting to get to it, et cetera. It is because there's pain. Pain hasn't been able to be healed, at least that's what the records -- some of the records indicate. The records are very inconsistent. I suspect that will be a theme of this trial.

But some of the records indicate there's pain, consistent pain, other measures, like such as injections, such as other physical therapy, et cetera, has not worked, and, therefore, this surgery is necessary. And I think because of the timing, particularly literally the month of the surgery about to happen and because it's handcuffing in particular to that area of the body.

You know, if her injury was to her legs, I don't think this would even be an issue that she got handcuffed on her wrists. Who cares? But because it's literally her wrist and that's what she's having the surgery on and it's due to pain specifically, this all speaks to her credibility with respect to damages and to causation with respect -- and more really more so damages and her credibility and really the credibility of some of her doctors too with respect to whether the surgery was necessary, whether she had --

THE COURT: I'm a little confused about it. I understood from your briefs this is really only relevant to damages because of the --

MR. THADANI: I misspoke. The damages -- to some extent, a credibility issue and a damages issue.

Credibility insofar as she's alleging she's in significant pain, she's telling doctors she's in significant pain to her wrist at this time, which is why it's a subjective complaint and she is saying this in medical records, she's saying this in connection with this lawsuit.

And then, again, this is evidence of, is she really in pain? Is it as serious as she's saying, because if your wrist is really in debilitating pain such that you need surgery and you're about to be cut open to cure that pain and you don't even say anything, you know, there's -- I think there's a -- I don't really see the world where she's in significant pain such as the records bare out. I believe her testimony will bare out, and then you contrast that with these events.

THE COURT: You know, it's interesting because I viewed the video a little differently when I saw it. You know, she's standing very still, she's compliant. They're putting a cuff around her wrist. You know, it would be one thing if it was the night of the incident when her wrist was quite swollen and there might necessarily be some friction or contact with the cuff. You know, it seemed you almost had the better argument with the point about her wielding the -- allegedly wielding a heavy object with the hand that's in pain

versus being passively cuffed, which just has a, you know, loose metal bracelet around. I mean I can understand you potentially arguing to the jury you would've thought someone in that kind of pain or with that kind of disability would warn the officers, say something to them in advance, but someone who's had an adverse experience with officers may have a lot of reasons why they wouldn't do so, maybe fear that it would get worse if they said that.

And I guess, you know, and just speaking a little bit to what I observed on the video, I think the -- you know, you would reference some admissions that she made. I think what you're really arguing is sort of admission by omission, that she isn't saying anything about her pain, not that she made an admission to any act, unless I'm missing something here, and please tell me if I am, about use of her hands.

MR. THADANI: Yeah. So one thing just to make sure I'm clear. I was not meaning to not argue the first component, which is the alleged use of the pipe and swinging. I understood your question to be focused on the handcuffing, which is why I addressed that first.

With respect to the admission, she does make admissions. She stated -- I don't think I put the quotes in the letter. She says, we started hitting on each other, I got my phone and tried to hit him. I tried to hit him with whatever I can. So she's being accused of what she did, and

then she's describing her version of the events, but while doing so admits using her hands, swinging her hands, swinging her phone, trying sort of -- there's other stuff too. Those are just some quotes there. I think, you know, the videos -- you know, you can see what she says in the video.

So obviously that -- you know, to, I guess, circle back to that point, that is also part of our contention, which is that to the extent that she's alleging this pain and injuries to her wrist, to her hands, that she would engage potentially in that kind of an action, whether it be what she was accused of or what she admitted to, either of those events, also goes to her credibility, also goes to damages.

THE COURT: But she's specifically asked about the pipe, and she says no, I didn't have a pipe; all I had in my hand was my phone. So she never makes an admission about the pipe.

MR. THADANI: That's true. She does not --

THE COURT: The only basis for that is the statement of a neighbor who himself was brought in, arrested, and I assume not charged with anything.

MR. THADANI: That's true. She made counter allegations against him. You know, I don't know if Your Honor is interested in this, but just so I can raise it because it was raised in reply and we didn't have a chance to respond to it, plaintiff's counsel indicated that we didn't disclose him.

That is not accurate. We did disclose him as the complainant as a witness. He's not on our witness list. That was on March 21st, 2019.

THE COURT: So you're not planning to offer any testimony from him; you just simply want to ask her about this incident and potentially, if allowed, impeach her with the video to the extent she --

MR. THADANI: If necessary. In theory, he's an impeachment witness, but we -- I mean, it depends. I mean in theory, Your Honor and Judge Kovner didn't require the listing of impeachment witnesses or impeachment evidence. He is a potential impeachment witness. Depending on her testimony, I don't know what she's going to testify to with respect to this if there's questioning permitted on it.

But as Your Honor has noted, there's a lot of paperwork. Your Honor had asked us specifically for what are the documents we intend to question on. I think I tried to clarify to Your Honor that we weren't intending to question about documents. There's a lot of documents I didn't provide because we're not intending to go there, arrest reports, 9-1-1 calls, 9-1-1 reports, criminal court complaints, all kind of other documents relating to this. I think the video would be potentially the impeachment evidence I wanted to flag for Your Honor given the inquiry.

THE COURT: So, okay, I think I understand your

position.

Let me just ask plaintiff's counsel to respond and specifically to address the argument that though there is some potential unfair prejudice to her from the jury seeing a video or even just hearing about a separate arrest, particularly in a case where no charges either were brought or she certainly was never convicted of any crime, putting that prejudice aside, there is some potential and maybe potentially significant relevance to damages in that she makes statement about getting into an altercation with a neighbor and then going to the hospital not complaining of hand pain and not saying anything to the officers when she's about to be cuffed about, careful with my hand, you know, it's very painful, that sort of thing.

MR. HARVIS: Well, I guess I think a number of things. One is that the -- it certainly is -- you know, there's no dispute that she has a hand injury. So this isn't a situation where they're, you know, trying to argue that this video proves that there was -- that her wrist wasn't injured. I don't think that that's an argument that the City could make on this record. I don't think that's really what they are trying to argue. And I think that the specifics here are very important.

First of all, the fact that it's happening in an arrest is inherently prejudicial, so I think that creates a

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    barrier to admissibility that I think has to be overcome by
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    some sort of substantial showing of relevance.
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               (Continued on the next page.)
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(Continuing.)

MR. HARVIS: And I think as Your Honor said, the fact that having been traumatized in handcuffs and abused by police and not given medical treatment in 2015, I think that there would be good reason for Ms. Martinez not to want to go above and beyond in having a big back and forth discussion with them about her wrist which is being handcuffed. As Your Honor, said there's no indication that they were overly tight handcuffs or even that they, at all, made any, kind of, contact that would be painful with her wrist, so I think we're making a lot of, kind of, assumptions there about how her wrists felt in that moment, and that therefore she had some failure to articulate pain that she must have been feeling. I think that that is a flawed assumption, I think that as Your Honor said.

In terms of the back and forth about this neighbor incident, I think that the fact of the dispute itself is prejudicial because it's just the jury hearing about some other argument that she had that I think would allow him to draw the impermissible conclusion that she's just an argumentative person, and you know, which would be support their narrative of what happened that night. I don't think there's anything that is inherently incompatible with having a wrist injury in 2015 means that you couldn't, you know, attempt to defend yourself with a cell phone in 2019. I don't

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think that that has the kind of direct connection that you would need to see here in order for this to be, you know, a valid area of examination. I just think the prejudice far outweighs the probative value, and I think that it's a separate issue on the question of the medical record. I think that if you -- if they had a good-faith basis to argue that there was something in the medical record itself that was inconsistent with her having had the injury that she had, like, they did a test of her wrist and her range of motion was perfect or something like that, I think that would be a closer But I think that just arguing that she doesn't, on one particular trip to the hospital that isn't about wrist pain, she doesn't happen to mention wrist pain, I think it's a bit of a stretch, and I think it's -- I don't think that there's -- I don't think they have a good-faith basis to say to her on the stand, now, you know, you were in the hospital in 2019 and you didn't mention your wrist pain, and she could just -- she may not have --

THE COURT: Well, they could certainly -- to the extent -- I'm not saying this is what would happen, because I understand some of the circumstances around the altercation, if, in theory, the records were entered without any reference to an arrest or to cuffing or to the NYPD, she says she's an assault victim in the records, but, you know, they do do some exam, they're doing a thorough reporting of pain, they can ask

her and she can answer, why isn't that, at least, something that tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable that goes to the jury's consideration of her damages and frankly, as Mr.Jadi [phonetic] said, her reliability as a reporter in terms of what kind of pain she's in and why she's suffering.

I mean, why isn't she saying, I'm going to have surgery in two weeks? These are all questions she could all answer on cross.

MR. HARVIS: Right. I mean, the question is, is it probative to whether or not she had a wrist injury in 2015, that on a particular day in 2019, when she's alleged to have perpetrated a pipe attack that she disputes, whether or not she should have mentioned that she had pain in her wrist that day. I'm just not seeing why her -- the fact that she hasn't put that in the record at her medical visit allows them to argue that she's an unreliable historian about what happened in 2015. I just -- I don't see the connection.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand your position.

Do you want to respond?

MR. THADANI: Yes, Your Honor, if I may. Just a few points. I'll try to be brief. And I know, it's a lawyer saying that.

THE COURT: That's okay. I was a lawyer for 20 years making all kinds of false promises about being brief.

MR. THADANI: I'll try to.

First, Your Honor, plaintiff's counsel stated there's no dispute there's an injury. So there is. I mean, there is going to be a dispute about whether she needed the surgery, whether she was truly in pain at that time period. So this is going to be an issue. And frankly, the fact that she doesn't mention her paint to other doctors is also going to be an issue in this case outside of this medical record. So I just want to make sure I preview that.

Second of all, it's not just that she didn't mention it, it is she is asked. If you look at the medical records and she is asked about different parts of her body and she doesn't say anything about her wrist. It's not like, tell me what's wrong with you. There's in the records every part of her body is referenced plus, minus, pain, swelling, tenderness, et cetera. So she was asked a question and she gave an answer, and it was, you know, either untruthful or potentially could have been untruthful.

A lot of plaintiff's counsel argument are weight argument, not about the actual probative value. It's about weight, this could be an answer, this could be an explanation, she didn't --

THE COURT: The most important thing is that the court reporter get a record, so everyone has my blessing to slow down, and I'll let you know if we are running out of

time. But week can all take it as slow as we did at the beginning.

MR. THADANI: The other thing I'll note as an aside is that this is not that dissimilar from the question we talked about at the beginning of this conference which is with Laliberte, so there is an excessive force allegation. They're trying to admit it for truthfulness. Here we have -- that's potentially prejudicial because it relates to a use of force. Here, we're talking about prejudice with respect to the fact of an arrest. But then this goes directly to damages and her credibility, based of showing of pain, not showing pain, taking this action, not taking this action, certain admissions. I do want to draw that comparison because, you know, I think it relates to some of the arguments being made.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I think I understand everyone's position.

Okay. Next. The Fortune Society medical records, plaintiff had moved to preclude them.

Is there still a dispute about the whether those medical records with any reference to prior arrest being redacted? Is plaintiff disputing the relevancy which you're entitled to do, I just want to clarify if we had a dispute over these or not.

MR. HARVIS: Yes, we are disputing that, Your Honor.

These records are from several years before the incident, and

they do contain extrinsic information about the prior arrest and the dispute with her neighbor, and then they also just have a lot of irrelevant medical information in them about, you know, things are not at issue in this case. And I mean, I supposed we could discuss with the City, you know, a way that they could redacted, assuming that they can tell us what in there is relevant. But from what we have seen, it seems like it's pretty completely irrelevant.

MR. THADANI: Can I just make one initial point?
THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. THADANI: So the fact that there's as much reference to us as the City is kind of exactly why we have the motion that we have.

THE COURT: I'm using this outside the jury's presence.

MR. THADANI: Sure. I understand. But that's, sort of, the function behind some of the motion practice, and that's an aside.

With respect to the document, I don't know -- I'm hoping I can say something that makes this not an issue, so we've indicated we've withdrawn it as an exhibit, we would use it for impeachment purposes only. Presumably, as a preliminary matter, means a jury is not necessarily seeing this document. It's really, like, I don't know what the plaintiff's going to testify to. There are statements here,

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these records reflect statements she made about her employment history, about her emotional damages, about her medical history. There's a lot of stuff here. I redacted some things that were somewhat particularly sensitive. But this is really, like -- I think this gets remedied by the questions asked on cross, not so much the document because depending on her answers and whether the questions are allowed to be asked, we don't get here until there's a question and there's an answer, and then this becomes credibility. And then even then, it's to show her, presumably, and you made this statement, and she denies or doesn't deny. It's not necessarily something that goes to the jury. So I'm not sure this is really, like, an issue. Maybe I'm wrong, and that's okay. But I'm thinking this is really an issue about questions about trial testimony, as opposed to the document, because it's not a document that's necessarily going to go to the jury when it was before. It was, they moved, it was an exhibit, we reconsidered our position. It's no longer an exhibit. It's an impeachment document. In theory, we didn't even have to list it, but it's there.

THE COURT: And I see its value potentially as an impeachment document in the limited areas. I took at quick look at it where it addresses her employment history and plaintiff is claiming economic damages and future earnings. I mean, I think -- I'll tell you now, I see some of the things

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in there as being areas of, at best, very tangential inquiry given the time period in advance, and my other concern is that jurors may know because we live in New York City that the Fortune Society is a diversion program or a post-release reentry program for people who have had some involvement with the justice system. You know, to the extent you want to ask her about you were seeing a mental health counselor, you were seeing a social worker, I'd be a little concerned about that reference, given how commonly it's known, and that it might indicate some prior justice system involvement that's really more prejudicial than probative in this case.

I understand that concern. MR. THADANI: I think, frankly, this is almost like a depends what happens at trial what she says. So I don't want to over-redact because I don't know what her testimony is going to be, I don't know what it's going to be on direct or cross. However, to the extent that there's something that's potential inconsistent with the records, I think -- and there may be questioning about them, I think there's a couple of different remedies. One is to raise it at sidebar before it's raised in front of the jury, and an alternative could be not mentioning, like, the name of the facility or even the type of facility. I don't know that that necessarily matters. I think so much as it's a medical professional. Presumably you're honest with people you talk to about your medical history, et cetera. Like, it doesn't

necessarily have to be a mental health or even naming the name of the place. I think because the point would be you testified X on the stand, you previously said Y, generally. I'm over-simplifying, Your Honor, obviously, but, like, that's the idea. I don't know that it's specifically the Fortune Society matters or that it's specifically to a mental health professional necessarily matters. So I think that may be remedied.

THE COURT: But I think to the extent it's impeachment, and we're talking, again, about circumstances under which a person would be expected to give a complete account, the source does matter. I don't think we would say it was a doctor if it was a social worker or if it was a therapist or it was someone else. So -- a teacher or a friend.

So I mean, statements are statements, and she can explain the context. I'm just concerned that when we're talking about something that did arise out of a prior arrest which everyone agrees should not come in, that we closely tailer the impeachment, if any, to the statements, rather than the circumstances.

So why don't we keep that mind. I don't want to create a mountain out of a molehill here since the parties are essentially in agreement that the records themselves from the Fortune Society are not being offered, that she may be cross

examined, if she opens the door, to some statements made, but with the understanding no not to mention of the Fortune Society will be made, and if you can agree on how you, perhaps, in advance would like to characterize the circumstances under which these statements are made so that we don't a lot of sidebars at issue during trial, I think that would be helpful. All right.

MR. THADANI: Understood.

THE COURT: Okay. Next, I wanted to briefly address defendant's motion to preclude evidence that defendants failed to read plaintiff her Miranda rights. I do understand, and I don't need to you to restate your substantive argument that the Supreme Court's case of *Vega versus Tekoh*, T-E-K-O-H, in which the U.S. Supreme Court clearly held that an officer's failure to read a suspect their Miranda warnings does not on its own constitute a violation of a Constitutional Right and the essentially that we not have a trial about a claim that is A, not cognizable, and B, not presented here regardless.

So I guess I would just ask plaintiffs to tell me first how do we keep this from being a mini trial about failure to read Miranda rights, given that that's not at issue here and can't be, and what relevance do you think this has to, specifically, the three claims that are still here?

MR. HARVIS: Sure. We don't want to make it a mini trial. I don't even think there's any dispute at all about it

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that would warrant a mini or a major trial. I mean Rosie Martinez said she wasn't Mirandized and the officers say she wasn't Mirandized. So it's just a very, I think, integral fact that reflects, in our view, the way that they were treating Ms. Martinez, just like any other fact, where she was held, how she was handcuffed and restrained and spoken to, the fact that they decided against their own training, against the Constitution, although it may knot be an independently -- you know, right that can independently be vindicated through a civil action for damages, does not mean that it is not a requirement under the Constitution and under the patrol guide, that if you're going to engage in custodial interrogation which everyone agrees happened here, that she would be told about her rights and she wasn't. We're not going to ask the jury to award damages, but it would be, in our view, unnecessary and it would serve no purpose for Ms. Martinez to be prohibited from testifying about one of the facts that shows that the officers were prepared to question her without following the proper guidelines.

THE COURT: So I think I would tend to agree with your point if the officers were actually conceding that they had an obligation to read her her rights and did not do so.

And maybe I'm providing an explanation the officers themselves haven't begin. But my understanding I think from some excerpts was deposition is that, at least, one of the officers

relevant --

is contending that he believed he didn't need to read her her rights because he wasn't actually questioning her, he was just, in his words, interviewing her and taking pedigree information.

Is that -- I guess I should ask defense counsel.

Is that his position and is there anything else

MR. HARVIS: I'm happy to address. And again, I do promise at the beginning of this conference when I stated we we were splitting up the topics, that is true still.

THE COURT: Mr. Kinney is ready to get in there.

MR. THADANI: That is still true. They're waiting to see what Your Honor brings them next and it just all happened to fall on me. But perhaps that will change at some point.

But just to address your question first and then some of the points Mr. Harvis made.

First of all, that is correct. I think actually the warnings are not required. It's a -- Miranda is a rule about preclusion. So if you get a statement that incriminates you and you didn't give the warnings, they're precluded. So that's -- and moreover, I think your question got to, like, characterization, so plaintiff's counsel just stated it's undisputed that this was a custodial interrogation. That is not undisputed. There is a different patrol guide section

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relating to debriefing which is what this was. And it may sound like semantics, but it is a difference. The difference is, in a custodial interrogation, the questioning is seeking to incriminate the person who's being questioned. debrief, which I think actually is undisputed this is a debrief, given I know what plaintiff's counsel's version of the events are is they're asking about other crimes, other information to help gather information. So there was an intelligence officer in this case. He's one of the defendants in the case. His job is to debrief every prisoner about information concerning guns, primarily, but other information of crime in the neighborhood. So he can investigate that information. In fact, that's how there's a search warrant in case for plaintiff's apartment was from a debrief from another arrest that occurred about one or two weeks earlier. That's how we got here in the first place, was from a debrief --

THE COURT: So let me ask you, regardless of what the patrol guide says, are the officers in this case -- had any of them individually, as individuals, not the City, per your request, as well as the law, are any of them -- have any of them affirmatively stated that they believed that they were not an obligation to give her her Miranda warnings at any point during the many hours that she was held in custody against her will at the station in cuffs, and if so, what is the basis for their claim?

What have they said is the reason they haven't read her her warnings.

MR. THADANI: Yes, and I think it's because of the nature of the questioning. And I think the questioning was about -- from our view, it's a little bit different, but I think it reaches the same conclusion. In our version, it is -- she was asked about firearms, guns, other crime, and in their version, she was asked about where Danny Rivera got his drugs.

THE COURT: So it's individual defendants have each claimed that at no point after recovering 285 or however many it was glassine envelopes of heroin in her apartment did they ever ask her if she knew anything about those drugs or knew where they came from?

MR. THADANI: I'm not sure about what the testimony of everybody. I think this questioning was really all centered on one particular defendant, Digennaro, in particular, and I believe his testimony is that he debriefed her, very short period of time asked her where -- asked her about -- they're saying about Danny Rivera. Our position is that he was asking about firearms and other crimes and she refused to talks to him, so he never really got into the substantive questioning, so it never got to Miranda rights. And again, like, our view -- plaintiff's counsel mentioned it wouldn't be a mini trial. I think our view is that there

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would be since, first of all, it listed several exhibits about this there's a patrol guide entry, they have portions of the student guide that they seek to enter with respect to the this, they have an expert witness, presumably, who they want to speak on this, and our position is they're not required, they can explain why they weren't provided and the danger -- I think our concern, primarily, over all of of this is first of all, it's tangential to the issues in the case which is was there force used on her or not, but more importantly there is really significant danger of unfair prejudice. If you tell a lay person whose knowledge is from television and from movies this person wasn't, quote, read their rights, no matter what instruction you give to that jury about damages, don't take this into account, this is not part of the claim, once you hear that, there's a significant danger of unfair prejudice, confusion -- especially when there's going to be, I think the amount of questioning they seek to have, the amount of exhibits they seek to have on it, they have a whole witness to talk about it. This is not, like, a one-question-and-done sort of thing, at least as it's being proposed now, and frankly, just hearing about it even from the plaintiff in terms of what happened in her version, they're going to hear that, and then that's enough to create an unfair prejudice especially given, I think, the minimal probative value, if. Any, of this testimony which is just it's parts of

the story.

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THE COURT: I guess I understand your point. I think two things. First, I would appreciate it, since I just asked to you tell me from memory what the individuals answered to this question was within the next few days, if you could in the letter you're already going to submit, just address what, if anything, the individual defendant said about the reasons why -- I understand it's undisputed that she was not read her rights -- but the reasons why they didn't do so, because one thing I'd like to consider and again, as with all of theses issues is, I'm not sure where I'm going to come down, is whether this issue, in fact, goes to their credibility about the other events in the precinct that night, because I think there is certainly a scenario under which a jury could find that their claim that they did not question her at all about the drugs in her apartment is itself not credible. If they're citing that as the reason, I should think it tends to make it more relevant to the dispute about what happened and how she was treated and what their interactions with her were then if they said, we asked her some basic questions, we talked to her about Rivera, but that didn't rise to the level of interrogation, and they have a good faith belief they don't need to read her her rights. But I'd likes to see what the testimony is to the extent it was addressed, and I certain hear your point about this being a side issue in the trial --

MR. THADANI: One thing as a caveat, I don't know that all of them were asked about this, so obviously, I can only provide based on the testimony. And again, I think it will bear out is again, like, from our position is she didn't want to the talk, so there was nothing. But I understand that's a dispute of facts.

THE COURT: Right. And I'm aware that there's parts of her deposition where she say she asked for a lawyer and wasn't given one, and that would be a disputed claim claim whether she was read her rights or not, because whether she was read them or not, if she asked or a lawyer, she's supposed to be given one, so that's not really relevant to Miranda, except that I could see a world where a jury wonders, well, if she asked for one and she knew her rights, then why wasn't she given one.

Okay. Let's move on. Expert witness Pollini and the NYPD Patrol Guide and the defendant's motion to preclude or limit his testimony.

So I know this report was written some time ago before Judge Kovner ruled on summary judgment, so I am presuming, and plaintiff's counsel can confirm if this is not the case, that there are, at least, significant portions of his report that will not be reflected in his trial testimony because they relate to claims that have since been dismissed.

Is that right?

MR. HARVIS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So the only question for me to decide is whether he meets the standard for relevance and admissibility under Rule 702, either as to liability or damages or both on the three remaining claims, excessive force, deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, and the officers' failure to intervene, as well as the related state law claims.

Is that right?

MR. HARVIS: Yes.

THE COURT: So you know, one concern I have with this report on the excessive force issue -- and I certainly know he's been admitted an as an expert before on cases with similar issues -- I think here there was a fair amount of language in the report that if he were to testify to it, I would have a jury disregard it, and I hope it will not come out of his mouth in which he says things like, the defendant's used excessive and unreasonable force. In which he cites Ms. Martinez's version of events as facts. So he says that they punched her, slapped her, kicked her. It occurred to me this might have been inartfully written and that what he meant to do was say, under her version of events, this constitutes excessive force.

Is that correct?

MR. HARVIS: Yeah. I don't see him having much of a role in deciding whether or not the force that was used is

excessive. I think that's where his value to the jury will probably be at its lowest point, in general.

THE COURT: Do you plan to offer him as an expert on excessive force in any way related damages? That is how far outside the bounds of permissible conduct it was if -- and again this is with an, if, the jury credits her version of events over the officers' which is of course the question for them to decide.

MR. HARVIS: I think that yes -- the answer is yes. I think that in the context of whether or not it was a use of force, how this sort of incident should be treated and documented, is something that he would testify about. But in terms of how far beyond the force that you would be permitted to use in that circumstance, this was, I don't know because it really is -- there really was no reason for any force to be used. So I could imagine a set of facts where there might be an expert to talk about, you know, this was the amount of permissible force, and this is how much they exceeded it. But since here, she was a handcuffed woman, you know, in this room, I don't think anyone's going to argue that there was any amount of force that was justified.

THE COURT: Well, I could certainly see it -- and maybe it's not even worth getting into because it's not this case -- a scenario where just like when an officer is subduing somebody in the course of arrest and has to use some force to

retain them, here, if what the officer said was true and she was harming herself, destroying property, causing damage to property, some force may be justified. But since Ms. Martinez is claiming that's not what happened, he's not here to testify about whether that's appropriate. And I think I understand that what you -- the parts of his report that you are currently offering his testimony on in light of the dismissed claims is that the credibility of their claim that they intervened in self to stop her from self-harming is undermined by their failure to follow police procedures on the paperwork; is that correct.

MR. HARVIS: That's right. And then also regardless of the injury or its cause, that the steps they failed to take during those hours that she was sitting in the room are also -- deviate from accepted police practices.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me ask defense counsel then, why is testimony from the police practices expert not, at least, relevant in the jury's consideration of proper procedures that could or should be used if your own clients' version of events is true, and why is that something that's not outside the experience and knowledge of the average jury, kind of what to do in a station house when an arrestee engages in self-harm or otherwise causes a danger to themselves or others.

Who would like to address that?

MS. McKINNEY: Me, Your Honor.

This goes to two points, Your Honor. In part, this argument also goes to defendant's point 10 in their motions in lim, also moving to preclude any motion of patrol guide sections.

The Joseph Pollini, you know, plaintiff's purported police practices expert relies very heavily in his report on various patrol guide sections which defendants argue are not relevant in this cases. It's not the controlling legal standard, particularly in cases like this where Plaintiff Martinez is asserting that her constitutional rights were violated. The courts have been very clear that that is not the controlling law in these cases which is generally why patrol guide sections are often precluded in this case. If you look at the -- Mr. Pollini's reports, he relies very helpful on patrol guide practices. That would be the first argument.

The second point to our argument is that these opinions in the reports are unnecessary because they relate to lay matters. He relies very heavily on a lack of improper documentation, which again, does not necessitate an expert report or opinion in this type of case. This is something that could easily be elicited through cross-examination of any of the individual officers on the stand when asked, you know, did you create there report? If so, why not? You do not need

a purported expert to take the stand to try to explain what is essentially just a lay person's opinion about whether or not documentation in this case should have been created. The remaining issues --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, when you say, a lay person's opinion, you mean that the jurors would be able to evaluate as lay people whether certain police forms or procedures should have been followed, and how old they had have that knowledge about whether the officers -- I certainly understand that the officers can and will testify about paperwork they prepared and why. But how is the jury going to have a basis to assess whether the officers are truthful and correct in their statements without the testimony from another person trained and who has some expertise in that area as a check, of sorts, because Ms. Martinez herself certainly doesn't have that experience or background, so why can't she call an expert to rebut that?

MS. McKINNEY: Because the officers as NYPD officers have their own baseline knowledge of how these procedures of paperwork are done. They can be cross-examined on that point.

Additionally, if you look at Mr. Pollini's opinion which we note in our motions in lim, essentially, he arguing that if information is not properly documented in the case, that it simply didn't happen which is something that has been previously rejected in the Circuit, an opinion that has been

previously rejected in the Circuit, because it is a conclusion that is far too speculative to be admissible expert testimony and therefore, it's going to be substantially more prejudicial than it is probative in this case and should be precluded on those grounds, as well.

Again, the remaining issues in this case are excessive force, whether or not officers failed to intervene in this excessive force allegation, and to be very clear, the defendants' position is that the plaintiff is completely fabricating this alleged beating at the hands of officers. That it simply didn't happen. You do not need the patrol guide sections as plaintiff's counsel admitted or an expert to go on the stand to tell anybody in the room that if an individual, any arrestee is handcuffed and not resisting, that of course, it would be excessive force and a Constitutional violation for any officer to beat that individual.

THE COURT: And just to stop you there, I take it on that point.

As it has in other cases, the defendants, the City, the individuals officers wouldn't object to an instruction to the jury that while it will be up to them to resolve a dispute about what happened on that night, if they find that the officers bent Ms. Martinez's thumb back, threatened her, slapped her, choked her -- you know, I'm paraphrasing, but I'm sure we will discuss what that instruction would like -- that

I could instruct them that that constitutes excessive force, and so your position is they don't need an expert to tell them that because they're going to be so instructed, and the real question is what they're going to find as a factual matter on that claim?

MS. McKINNEY: Yes. And also that patrol guide sections are not the controlling law as to what should or should not have been documented and whether or not that makes it more or less likely that this Constitutional violation occurred, and therefore, it should also be precluded on those grounds, as well.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand your position.

Is there anything else outside what you argued in your papers on either the patrol guide sections or the expert that you'd like to bring to my attention?

MS. McKINNEY: One second.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. THADANI: Just a couple of things, Your Honor.

First of all, I think just to balance out the point my colleague made is, what is the relevance of the failure to document. To the extent they're trying to argue that this one event happened over the other because there was no unusual occurrence report or there was no document in the command log and there was nothing in the memo book, I'm not sure how

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that's relevant. And frankly, there is contemporaneous documentation in the case anyway. We know. We just talked about it. We talked about Hanrahan's report, the IAB call made by *lieutenant Cam reporting what was observed, et cetera. So a lot of this has to do with the failure to document, but that's not what the case is about. The case is about whether there was a use of force or not.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there, because I definitely understand your position. I think -- I certainly see the strength of your argument on the excessive force I think where plaintiff makes a fair point, and I'll just ask you to address this specific thing, is that they're not saying the failure to document is itself the violation, it's that the gap in Pollini's view -- and you'd be free to cross-examination Mr. Pollini about why he's wrong, or have your clients explain why he's wrong -- but that what he identities as the discrepancy between their version of events and what they claim were the self-inflicted injuries by Ms. Martinez and her conduct, versus the paperwork that they actually prepared, the individuals they did or didn't notify whether that happened, is something from which the jury could say belies of truth of their claim. That if, in the universe where what they say happened, they would have filled out forms A, B, and C, they would have notified individuals one, two, three, and the fact that they didn't do that is something from

which the jury could find this didn't happen. That's more argument, but that's the relevancy of those sections of the guide and relevancy of his testimony.

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So please it will me why plaintiff is wrong --

MR. THADANI: Sure. So I think this pivots to the point I was jumping in to raise any way which is now that we know thanks to Your Honor's order which specific patrol guides we're talking about here -- and I don't know if Your Honor wants me to go through each one, because there's a fair amount and I have something to say about each one and how they don't -- either they're completely tangential because they relate to, not this issue, about rather, arrest processing or releasing a prisoner which didn't happen here, which I don't know why that's even on this list. But even the -- Pollini is tieing his report to the plain language of the patrol guide. He is basically just, the patrol guide says X, they didn't do X, so Y. So I'm not sure in his report he really applies any expertise besides he knows how to read the parole guide.

With respect to the patrol guide entries, they don't say what plaintiff is asserting they say. If you look at the specific sections, like, for instance, there's a section on unusual occurrence, it has description of what an unusual occurrence is. This item, this sequence of events is not an option there. They have procedures about what to do when a prisoner requires treatment. That's fair. But the version --

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
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the contention here is whether she required treatment or not, not so much what should have happened if you thought that she didn't need treatment.

They have -- I mean, they have a entry with respect to Miranda which obviously we've spoken about, so I won't The same thing with the student guide section. Ι hinted at this, there's two arrest processing sections which the arrest is not an issue. There's no false arrested claim. I'm not sure why -- whether or not -- how she was processed or whether she was transported from the scene to the precinct really relates to any of the issues in dispute in the case. Two ten thirteen is the one that's probably the least related. It has to do with release of prisoners only applies when either you determine that the plaintiff didn't commit the crime or the DA's office says they're not pursuing charges. Not the case here. There's one on force guidelines which -- I think one is we made the case that Ms. McKinney has already raised this, given the allegations here, if the jury believes plaintiff's version, there's no dispute that it's a excessive force, and the problem with the force guidelines patrol guide entry is that really it's going to --- if the jury is going to see that, is going to get that, it's essentially an alternate form of jury instructions. If you look at the actual entry, it talks about the factors once you take into account with respect to whether or not forces is excessive or not --



Avery N. Armstrong, Official Court Reporter, RPR

THE COURT: Given the late hour, I understand a lot of your concerns.

Let me ask plaintiff this. If Mr. Pollini is allowed to testify as an expert on the issues that you've identified here today, do you have any need to independently introduce the patrol guide's sections that you've submitted other than as something that he may reference in his testimony specifically tied to opinions that he's giving about these issues?

MR. HARVIS: No. The only other use for them that I could see beyond Peliny discussing them is just to the extent they come up in cross-examination. And that would not be to offer them before the jury, and that would not be to offer them before the jury, and that would only be on relevant topics. It would not be on the things that are of concern to the defense counsel.

THE COURT: So what I'm going to ask you to do -- and again, I haven't yet ruled on the issue of whether he can testify altogether is, I'll leave it to you as to when. The quicker you do it, the easier it will be for me to give you a prompt ruling, so it's in everyone's interest to do it relatively quickly. Why don't you confer with your expert. Identify not just the sections of the guide, but the specific provisions within there upon which he intends to rely on the three remaining claims, provide them to your adversary, and

then let's see if we have any dispute about whether those can come in. He's not testifying on Miranda, even if that issue comes in. He's testifying on excessive force only potentially as to damages. And even then, the guide section may not be relevant because of what it addresses.

So I'll just ask you to narrow it as best you can and identify those sections and let's see if we have a dispute. And if we do, then defense counsel can send me a letter and let me know the basis for your objections in that context. And if I have it in time to rule on when I do the written ruling on the rest, I will. If not, we can save it for trial. All right?

MR. HARVIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk next about another expert, Dr. McMahon, the orthopedic surgeon.

So I've reviewed his report and I understand the opinions that he formed as of the date of his report in 2017. I know that he has not, according to defense counsel, updated his report since February of 2017.

Let me ask plaintiff's counsel, do you have any intention of having him testify about any treatment she received or her condition after the date of his report?

MR. HARVIS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So if that's the case, then let me ask defense counsel, what grounds do I have to exclude it

on the ground -- you know, on the basis that it hasn't been updated? And isn't anything that you've argued with respect to the lack of reliability or validity of his opinion something that you can address through cross-examination about how he hadn't examined her in, I guess, close to five years now, maybe more? And doesn't that really go to weight rather than the admissibility?

MS. MCKINNEY: Defendants are not going to object as long as they do limit Dr. McMahon's testimony to anything prior to February 3rd, 2017, in the report.

THE COURT: Okay. And I take it that means he's also not going to rely on any records of hers produced after that date?

MR. HARVIS: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's go to one that I expect may be a little trickier on the defendants' motion to require plaintiff to name two specific defendants in her excessive force claim.

So, first, this references a point Mr. Thadani made earlier. I understand you didn't move for summary judgment on the excessive force claim itself because there's clearly a factual dispute, and, as you've said, if the jury credits Ms. Martinez's version of event, they could certainly find that someone engaged in excessive force from the NYPD that night.

But my question is, why didn't you move for summary judgment as to the individual officers that you represent on the grounds that there was not enough evidence that any of them as individuals committed the acts that they were alleged to?

MR. THADANI: That's a good question. It's because, as I noted earlier and the complaint still states, only Forgione and Weitzman used excessive force at the time that we filed the motion for summary judgment. And so there, there was an issue -- it was an issue of fact. Use of force or not. That's why we're here at trial. It wasn't until opposing summary judgment that the plaintiff finally changed from Weitzman and Forgione to Ryan and one of three people. And so at that point -- we're past moving for summary judgment at that point.

MR. HARVIS: May I respond to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HARVIS: Yeah. I mean, I think that's totally misleading honestly because we had proceedings before Judge Pollak, we were in front of Judge Pollak like on almost a monthly basis. She -- before the Court and with defendants they knew that there was an evolution and we were getting discovery and that they almost got their case dismissed because of terminating sanctions on this very issue. And there was multiple conferences where we would go before Judge

Pollak and talk about where we stood and what was our current understanding of who we thought it was and they're just -- the idea that they were somehow -- it came out of left field that these were the people that we were saying were potentially the wrongdoers on the excessive force claim is just not true. And pleading in the alternative is totally accepted in the Second Circuit.

And the City, and I use that purposefully here, is liable regardless of who it was that actually hurt her on the state law assault and battery claim, which was sustained at summary judgment by Judge Kovner. We don't need to show personal involvement. And so the jury -- if the jury is somehow told that they cannot consider certain defendants as having assaulted her, that would actually be intention with what the law is on the assault and battery claim where there is no personal involvement requirement.

And there is -- it is we believe perfectly appropriate factual dispute to resolve by the jury. We're not suggesting that more than two officers did it, but we believe it's for the jury to decide on evidence that the Court has already held is sufficient to raise triable issues with respect to these defendants. We believe Judge Kovner specifically reached that issue in the opinion and the defendants did not seek reconsideration of that opinion.

And we don't see any reason -- we think that it

would be a wrong on the law for us to have to select it, and particularly given the fact that there was strong evidence here and findings from the Court that they were -- that they concealed their identity and frustrated the fact-finding process in terms of --

THE COURT: So is it your position that the jury should not be told and need not be told which of the two defendants, that the verdict sheet could actually list all four, and you will tell them there were two and it's up to them and you don't even have to take a position as to which two?

MR. HARVIS: Well, I don't think that -- right. I think that the verdict -- the correct verdict sheet would list all of them, but it would say underneath it, you know, you should select two. If you've selected two, go on to the next question. That would be how we would think it would be appropriate, because we don't think this record -- you know, we don't think -- since there's sufficient evidence that would sustain a verdict as to personal involvement for any of these four people on the excessive force claim, we think that it's appropriate for the jury to make that final determination just like any other question of fact.

THE COURT: What's your response?

MR. THADANI: Sure. Okay. So, first of all, to the extent plaintiff's counsel is referencing -- I mean, if you

just look at the first two paragraphs of our reply to the motion for summary judgment opposition, we expressed shock and awe by the fact that this was happening. That's how we started the reply.

THE COURT: That what was happening?

MR. THADANI: That we've gone from these two individuals. Understood -- I think there was an understanding that they were at some point perhaps going to come off of Forgione and Weitzman to somebody else. Who those people were, I still don't know right now today. I don't think they know by the fact of what they just said, and that they picked one and then one of three people. We addressed that in summary judgment.

It wasn't even an issue. We didn't rule on excessive force. They brought it up as part of many different issues that are raised on opposition. We raised that in the reply, immediately raising an objection to the fact that that was happening. Judge Kovner didn't rule on it because it wasn't before her. There was no issue with respect to excessive force there.

With respect to -- they keep mentioning this concealed identity. I have no idea what that means. I don't even know how to respond to it. I truly don't know what that means, that the defendants were concealing their identity.

MR. HARVIS: Can I tell you, Your Honor, what it

means?

THE COURT: You can tell me. Address me instead of your adversary.

MR. HARVIS: Thank you. What it means is that Ryan went in front of the CCRB and was asked 45 minutes of questions about that night specifically and chose to say nothing or acknowledge his involvement in grabbing Ms. Martinez.

We -- Hanrahan -- there may be a facially plausible explanation for it, but what Hanrahan -- there is a set of facts in which he used the wrong numbers at the top, put down the wrong date, said that she had been interviewed and didn't make any complaints, and then filed their way in a drawer and no one ever knew about it. And as a result, we all spun our wheels for like two years in discovery.

And so, you know, that is really what I'm getting at when I talk about the concealment, that Ryan affirmatively concealed that in his CCRB testimony, and that we think -- although now it's difficult because he's deceased, we think that, you know, there was an effort also at kind of through the Hanrahan report kind of putting this under the rug.

And we understand that may not be able to be fleshed out at trial as much as we would like, but we certainly think it's a valid contextual point to make. I'm going to let

Mr. Thadani --

MR. THADANI: Sure. So I still don't know what that means. I truly mean that.

So the fact that Ryan -- I tried to explain this I think in some of the papers, but again, there's a lot of factual history here. Ryan was questioned about allegations made by a nonparty, Danny Rivera, with respect to what happened. With respect to Danny Rivera, yes, he did not mention anything about Rosie Martinez punching the wall, kicking cabinets. He was not asked about that or his observations relating to her at all. I suspect that will come out in trial very clearly.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, even though she was the injured prisoner that prompted Camhi's phone call to IAB, Hanrahan never asked Ryan any questions about his observations with Ms. Martinez at all?

MR. THADANI: I apologize for not being clear. So Ms. Harvis is reflecting a CCRB investigation. That is completely separate from all of this. That relates to --

THE COURT: I see.

MR. THADANI: -- allegations made by Danny Rivera he's alleging excessive force against him. And in connection with an interview of Detective Ryan there, he did not speak to what he observed Rosie Martinez doing. He was not asked about Rosie Martinez, and he was not asked about those observations. Again, I know that will come out at trial.

THE COURT: And he was not interviewed by Captain Hanrahan?

MR. THADANI: He was. So with respect to that -- and that's the Hanrahan report we're talking about -- it states that he observed her punching the wall and kicking cabinets.

So this is not a -- I mean, I don't know how you can say he's concealing his identity. The most contemporaneous document that reflects what he observes states that. But also as an aside, that's not concealing your identity. The plaintiff is stating this happened in a well-lit room, no one's wearing masks. I'm saying who did this? There's been video depositions, hours long, of every single person. There's been photographs produced of every single person. His argument is concealing identity. They're all saying it didn't happen. So in and of itself they're concealing their identity, if that's your definition of it.

Plaintiff has the burden of proof, to prove personal liability of specific people. This is not let's put four names and let's just see what the jury does and they'll put check marks wherever they feel like. That is not the law. There are situations where the plaintiff cannot identify somebody. For instance, let's say they are, you know, facing the ground and cannot see who is assaulting them among ten officers. That may be a situation that would make sense for

maybe something like this where I don't know who hit me because I didn't see it. So I can't say whether it was Officer Jones or Smith or whoever.

But here that's not this case. This case is, she saw who did it. She is alleging who did it. This is not for the jury to just decide, well, I increased my statistical odds if I put four names on there and they get to pick two, I have a better chance of winning now because it's not just two people there. There's -- I don't know this for a fact, but I can't imagine there being any verdict form that is anything like that, pick two. So the first question is, did the defendants use excessive force? If so, pick whichever two you feel like picking. It's an ab- -- I think, frankly, respectfully, absurd position.

THE COURT: I mean that's a bit of a -- we all know a verdict sheet would be much more specific than that and talk about burdens and reasonable doubt and all that. But I get your point that there's a -- it's not a multiple-choice exam regardless of what burden they're held to, that your position is and you've cited some case law and support that at least by the close of the evidence before the case goes to the jury, if the plaintiff's contention is that two officers assaulted her, your position is that she must make some assertion to the jury about who those two were and they must decide if they credit that allegation.

137 Is that the your accusation? 1 2 MR. THADANI: I mean, in part. I think it's -- I 3 don't know that it's appropriate or fair in these -- and 4 again, they keep raising sanctions in discovery and 5 misconduct. We're past that now, right? Discovery is closed. 6 All the discovery is done. The sanctions already happened. 7 All the motions papers are done. We're at trial now. Okay? 8 And I don't think it's proper to raise a claim that they admit 9 is only against two people that she saw and then say I'm going 10 to bring it against four people. I don't know that that's 11 I don't know that that's --12 THE COURT: When you say you don't think it's 13 proper, I know that you didn't move for summary judgment on 14 excessive force, are you disputing Mr. Harvis's statement that you were on notice because of everything that happened before 15 16 Judge Pollak, the huge dustup that came when Officer Ryan's 17 statements came to light, when the Camhi phone call came to 18 light, that you weren't on notice that they were likely or 19 certainly going to be named as individual defendants in this 20 case? 21 MR. THADANI: I think my expectation was they would 22 find -- at some point identify two people. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. THADANI: I want to make it clear. That's the 25 issue. It's not that they changed from person A and B to

whoever else. It's they're saying it's two people. Name two people. And we would not have moved. I can tell you right now. If they had done that before summary judgment practice, we would not have moved for summary judgment.

THE COURT: So let me just try to bring this part to a close and see if I understand the issue. And I apologize if this was more clearly stated in your motion and I didn't grasp it at the time.

What exactly is your motion in limen? What are you asking me to order? It's a motion to have her name two specific individuals for the excessive force claim. When are you saying she needs to name them? What am I limiting and what am I instructing plaintiff to do?

MR. THADANI: So I think it is not appropriate for the trial, at the beginning of the trial, for the claim of excessive force to be against more than two individuals. I understand their argument with assault and battery. That's fine. I get that. But with respect to excessive force in particular, if the allegation is two individuals use excessive force on me, the trial should be -- when the trial begins and when the jury is told what the claims are and even during opening statements, before that starts, it should be -- the claims should be asserted against two people, not let's see what all the evidence is. Both sides do a whole trial and at the end right before closings we'll decide if even that's -- I

don't know if that's where Your Honor was leaning or not. But even that I think is inappropriate.

It should be the before the trial they decide we're bringing this particular claim, assault and battery is a separate thing, but with excessive force in particular where they concede in the heading of their opposition, plaintiff only brings this claim against two defendants. Who are the two defendants? We already know presumably Ryan is one of them unless that's a backtrack. I don't know. But the affidavit said Ryan and one of these other three people. So really it's really just identifying one of the three people.

THE COURT: I understand that point. You buried in there though a little reference to, well, assault and battery is separate. So you seem to concede that she wouldn't need to choose based on assault and battery. So as long as she's going to have the opportunity to name any of the four because of the City's liability if they find for her, what is the point of artificially limiting her on the excessive force claim? Isn't the jury going to be incredibly confused when they're told on the one hand you can find as a matter of state law that any of four of these defendants assaulted her if you believe that happened, but as a matter of federal law, you have to pick two. If I were a juror, I don't think I would know --

MR. THADANI: So in their JPTO, plaintiff's

indicated that assault and battery claim -- let's see if I can find the page. It's on page 2. State law assault and battery against City of New York. That's the only defendant they have for that claim.

Our position in line with the motion in limine we made about the City of New York, the question should be, was plaintiff -- something to the effect of, you know, did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was subjected to an assault and battery on January 23rd, 2015? There's no -- it's a yes or no question. There's no Ryan, Camhi, Digennaro, pick a -- flip a coin in the air, you know, pick whoever you want.

THE COURT: And you don't have any objection to it going to the jury in that form, in some form, that particular -- the state law?

MR. THADANI: I think we have to see where the evidence -- the evidence may not support that. But to the extent we're going into trial, right, and the claim is an excessive force against two people, the City -- the state law assault and battery is against the City, that's how it should go through, excessive force against two people because personal involvement matters for Section 1983 claim. And assault and battery against the City, okay. That's the claims that they are asserting going into the trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have anything to add

besides the points you've already made specifically about the issue of any authority you have that says you do not have to name before trial who the two individuals are?

MR. HARVIS: I would just point to Rule 8 and the fact that alternative pleading is permitted under the Federal Rules, and that we would be saying that Ms. Martinez alleges that she was assaulted by Ryan and one of these other three. One of the issues for the jury to decide is, was she assaulted, and was it one of these three?

And we're not aware of any authority that requires -- you know, we just have to have enough evidence to show personal involvement. And we think there's no way to read Judge Kovner's decision other than, you know, agreeing and holding that there was sufficient evidence presented that would support the verdict for any of them. And it's really a question of whether at the close of the evidence we've shown enough that would allow the jury to -- you know, to find that two of the individuals actually committed it.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move now to defendants' motion to preclude the plaintiff from seeking economic damages.

Let me ask plaintiff to state briefly. I was a little unclear. Maybe I am clear, but I just want to confirm. What categories are you claiming by way of economic damages? I think I read your submission only as to be future lost

earnings. Is there anything else?

MR. HARVIS: No, that's it.

THE COURT: Okay. And you're not introducing an expert; you're just submitting her testimony and any supporting documentation?

MR. HARVIS: Yeah. She was earning this amount and now she can't work anymore, and this is how many years, you know, she would be able to work. It's pretty much a lay argument.

THE COURT: Okay. So defendants, how are you prejudiced at this date, and especially I would ask you to just address given the sanctions history on your side why the very drastic remedy of precluding an entire category of damages should apply here given that she's not calling an expert so we're not talking about a Rule 26 report that wasn't disclosed in a timely fashion and we're really just talking about her testimony and you're free to cross-examine her on that?

MR. THADANI: Sure. I think the rule is there for a reason. They had to disclose her obligation. It clearly wasn't met. I think you referenced something I was going to reference. Given the history of the case and given the significant sanctions against the City with respect to discovery in this case to not have a sanction at some sort for the failure to disclose this information as it's required.

And, frankly, even forget about sanctions, I cited case law where I think it was something to the effect of, like, plaintiff proceeded at her peril. They indicated that they were going to provide this information and never did. And the prejudice is they didn't comply with the rules. They still haven't, by the way, even written a response to this, they could have supplemented their disclosures to give a calculation. They put, I think, 65,000 -- she was unemployed, by the way, or not unemployed. That will be an issue at trial. She gave inconsistent statements about her employment history at the time she was arrested.

But putting that aside, she actually was just about to get fired from her job that she was making the \$65,000 per year that they're using their calculation on apparently. And I don't know that \$65,000 times pick a number of years out of a hat is a sufficient calculation. But, moreover, the key is, the lack of disclosure. And there was a requirement to disclose and they chose not to do it.

THE COURT: Right. But preclusion is not a sanction that operates every time there's a violation of the obligation to disclose. So even if I agree with you that she should have affirmatively supplemented earlier, in what way are you prejudiced to the point where the high bar for precluding her from seeking an entire category of damages is met other than there should be some sanction and at this point if this goes

to trial, I may only have two options, allow her to testify on this or don't, allow them to seek those damages or don't? How does this really harm you because can't you just -- you know what the number is now, they've given you the information they intend to offer. How are you prejudiced?

MR. THADANI: No, that's fair.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Let's talk about nominal damages then next. This is the plaintiff's motion that the jury not be instructed on nominal damages.

So I am inclined to defer this to the charge conference when we see what the actual testimony is that comes in about damages. I guess what I'm wondering is, for the defense on the excessive force claim, do you agree that if they find for the plaintiff on liability given that she has sustained some physical injury on excessive force or assault and battery, that a nominal damages instruction would not be appropriate? And what we're really talking about is whether she sustained any additional damages that are not nominal on the other two claims?

MR. THADANI: No.

THE COURT: You don't? Okay. Tell me why.

MR. THADANI: Okay. So with respect -- I mean we made our case with respect to the deliberate indifference claim. I think that's actually pretty strong, but your question was about the excessive force.

At trial there's going to be a lot of evidence with respect to these injuries. And, first of all, the -- yes, I mean, first of all, there's the different versions of events, but it's possible a jury could find part of both versions of events to be true and still find liability, that there was a use of excessive force and she punched the wall and injured herself. So at that point then, her damages result from that and not necessarily -- not necessarily the alleged excessive force that they're presenting. That's one.

Two is there's ultimate --

THE COURT: What excessive force would they find that she purchased the wall and --

MR. THADANI: For instance, you could bend someone's finger back and not cause an injury verses you punch the wall and you cause an injury. And so they could find that doing this mechanism was excessive force under the circumstances but didn't cause necessarily any injuries sufficient enough to award compensatory damages.

The world exists. Do I think it's likely? Not necessarily, but it's possible. And it's not impossible. I think plaintiff tried to assert in their letter, it's impossible to find nominal damages if the jury finds on excessive force. I cited case law that indicates that in excessive forms claims -- I think even the case they cited from the Second Circuit indicated basically the position I

just presented to you.

Moreover, aside from just like the sequencing of events, there's also -- the medical records are fairly complicated here. There's some serious causation issue. She came in with a wrist wrap, arguably came in with the injury already, understandingly apparently normal. That's based on observations and what she says, not based on what the records show.

There's evidence that shows she reinjured herself over time or may have or subsequent trauma caused her injuries or long-term injuries, the nature of her work, she had degenerative conditions. There's a lot in the medical records about where her actual injuries came from as opposed to the use of force. So there is a world where they could find that the officers used excessive force, but it didn't cause sufficient injury to merit compensatory damages. That world exists.

THE COURT: All right. Any response on that point?

MR. HARVIS: No. I think we should talk about it at the charging conference.

THE COURT: Yes, I'm going to defer consideration of this until the charge conference. I appreciate your clarification and I am certainly thinking about the possibility of nominal damages on excessive force in a different way in light of your argument. I think given --

just to preview kind of the issues that we may want to focus on when we get to that point, I think given that in the Second Circuit case that both parties cited, some of the other case law I've reviewed on excessive force, the causation question typically comes from when the events are undisputed and the question is the reasonableness of the officers' use of force under the circumstance.

Here we're really talking about a plaintiff and defendants whose versions of what happened are diametrically opposed. And so I guess while I guess theoretically possible for the jury to credit both versions of events; on the one hand, they bent her thumb back and told her, you know, in sum and substance we're doing this because you're not cooperating; and on the other, she also self-harmed, I think that's extremely unlikely and we're creating a risk of error if we throw a nominal damages instruction in there because of that. But I certainly want to hear the medical evidence that you referenced and hear how the testimony comes in. So I'm going to defer consideration of this motion.

All right. Let's see if we can briefly discuss -- I do have a hard stop at around 6:15 -- defendants' motion to preclude the testimony of what I understand are three non-officer defendants witnesses, Pontecorvo, Trotter and Valerga.

MR. HARVIS: Your Honor said non-officer, but ${\tt I}$

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    think you meant nonparty.
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              THE COURT: Sorry. Nonparty. Thank you for that
    correction.
                 Nondefendant officers, not non-officer
 3
 4
    defendants.
5
              So none of these three are defendants, am I right,
    that those are the only three that plaintiff may seek to call
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7
    other than the individual defendants?
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              MR. HARVIS: Well, no, actually.
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              THE COURT: Other than for impeachment.
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              MR. HARVIS: Hold on one second. Sorry. I just
    want to -- I don't want to get this wrong. There were --
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    we -- in our opposition, we talked about a couple of officers.
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              Did Your Honor mention Valerga? I'm sorry.
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              THE COURT: Yes. Trotter, Valerga and Pontecorvo.
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              MR. HARVIS: Then Your Honor is correct.
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              THE COURT: Let's talk about Trotter. To avoid
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    deciding unnecessary issues, is there any likelihood he will
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    actually be here since I gather he lives in Arizona and may be
19
    outside of the subpoena power of the Court?
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              MR. HARVIS: I guess not.
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              MR. THADANI: Yes, correct.
              THE COURT: He has no intent to appear. Okay. If
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    he shows up, we can address his testimony when it happens, but
    we will cross him off the list for now.
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              MR. HARVIS: Okay.
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THE COURT: As to Valerga and Pontecorvo, I understand from plaintiff's submissions that there are -there is some documentation by Pontecorvo and Valerga -sorry, some documentation that Pontecorvo made a written entry regarding plaintiff's wounds being self-inflicted, and that Valerga was deposed and said there was, in his words, a quote, high probability, unquote, that he spoke with Defendant
Laliberte the day after the incident about what happened. Is that right? Am I right about what arguably ties them to the case?

MR. HARVIS: Yeah. You know, Trotter was the one who -- both Trotter and Pontecorvo were at the hospital with Ms. Martinez when this mysterious entry is made in her record that a police officer reports that she was punching the wall. I think that the evidence -- I think that that's true. I think that they both were there. Nobody claims to remember anything, so, you know, it's not going to be a long examination. But I do think that there are questions that would be relevant to ask Pontecorvo about what happened at the hospital.

THE COURT: So given that record, you know, marginal though it may be for relevance, but certainly by their own statements tying them either to some account by the individual officer or officer defendants and at least one of them making an entry about what he was told or what he observed happened

to the plaintiff, why aren't we at least at the basic bar for relevancy and we can deal with scope of their testimony if and when they're called?

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, so I'm understanding, excuse me, that Pontecorvo was not at the hospital, so --

MR. HARVIS: Not at that time.

MR. FRANK: Not at that time. So his statement in the medical record, that statement that appeared in the medical record is also just not relevant to any of the claims or defenses at issue.

THE COURT: When you say it's your understanding, that's based on what, that he wasn't at the hospital?

MR. THADANI: It's based on his memo book and then the medical record. The time of the medical record and the time in the memo book for both Pontecorvo and Trotter of when Pontecorvo was there, the times don't match.

THE COURT: So what is your understanding as to why he wrote an entry in his -- am I confusing the witnesses?

MR. HARVIS: No. Your Honor, it's that Trotter said to -- Trotter at least seems to have said to the medical staff that Ms. Martinez was observed punching the wall. That's in her medical record. So it's not that Pontecorvo made a record in his own note. And Mr. Thadani may be right. I certainly, in my mind, thought of Trotter as being the more vital witness. So maybe we need to focus our efforts on getting him

back from Arizona rather than arguing about Pontecorvo. I
think maybe we don't need Pontecorvo. What we really need is
Trotter. But we certainly want to argue about Valerga.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, I don't think there's any point in calling a witness if the other records show he wasn't actually present to say what somebody else reported, if he's admitting that. I'm thinking of Pontecorvo in this regard.

MR. HARVIS: As I'm thinking about it though, now that I'm thinking through Trotter being in Arizona, I mean, I'm just not sure -- in our view -- I'm sure there's a dispute, but in plaintiff's view and I think in Judge Pollak's view, it's a critical fact that someone -- and we believe Trotter -- you know, told medical staff that Ms. Martinez was observed punching the wall because it raises all kinds of questions of, you know, this hasn't even been reported yet when this -- at the time stamp of the medical record shows the officers hadn't called this in yet. They were waiting to hear.

And so I'm just trying to think out loud about how that -- how that record is going to come in. And if Trotter is not there -- I think we may need to talk to the City about trying to come up with something so that we can deal with that issue. But I don't think that calling Pontecorvo is the answer.

THE COURT: Okay. Why wouldn't it come in through

the medical record? I mean, it's a statement that's in the medical record. I guess it's not a statement for diagnosis and treatment, but if no one is disputing that he made it --

MR. HARVIS: I see. Yeah.

THE COURT: I mean it might be a statement. It's not her statement for diagnosis and treatment, but he is an officer reporting to medical staff what he claims to have seen. I guess you're not claiming it's a statement offered for its truth; you're claiming it's offered for something totally different?

MR. HARVIS: Right. That would be our argument. I guess I want to give it some more thought, and I don't think it will be an issue. But if it is, we'll bring it to the Court's attention.

THE COURT: Why don't you confer and let me know if there's any remaining dispute about these witnesses, and I'll defer consideration of the motion until then.

MR. HARVIS: That sounds good to me.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to ask very briefly. We've got two more to go on my list of things that are still in dispute that I had questions about.

One is plaintiff's motion to use leading questions on direct examination of nondefendant officer witnesses. I know that no one or the defense counsel is not disputing that they can lead the individual defendant officers when they call

them on direct, plaintiff I mean. And I guess for plaintiff,
I have two brief questions for you.

One is, with respect to these non-officer defendant witnesses, if in fact they're called, I'm not sure if any are going to be called, you know, as you know, the prevailing practice in this district is to deny this without prejudice and give you leave to make the motion again if the witness proves hostile at trial.

Is there any reason why I shouldn't do that here?

Any specific reason why you need to know in advance how they'll be treated?

MR. HARVIS: No, not really. I just say we do have their deposition testimony, so I think that gives us a little bit more insight into how they're going to testify. So I think that might make it unnecessary to defer it. But certainly we don't have any objection if that's how the Court wants to proceed.

THE COURT: I think that's probably easier. I mean I think to the extent especially that they're claiming lack of recollection and in light of Judge Pollak's decision, my inclination is to give you some reign to lead them, but let's see who's called and see what the issues are and we'll take it from there. All right?

MR. HARVIS: Sounds good.

(Continued on the next page.)

(Continuing.)

THE COURT: Okay. Last motions and then we still have some other matters to address. The motion to admit -- this is plaintiff's motion to admit defendant's Rule 36 submissions.

You know, I'm aware of and I tend to agree with your position that these are binding admissions. I guess I'd just ask the City to address plaintiff's argument that the whole purpose of these admissions during discovery is to narrow the issues in dispute of trial, and even if plaintiff could bring this in by other means, that's not really for me to decide. Once you've admitted it, they can present the evidence in the fashion they think is best.

MR. THADANI: Sure. So you know, I think that I was unclear what they were asking me for, because they presented at stipulations initially. So to the extent, as Your Honor may know, we went through each one and for some of the them it was just the witness is going to testify. There's no need for a stipulation. To the extent that that's not what they're seeking, per se, which it sounds like they're not, I don't think those are the disputed one. I think that the crux of the argument really from our perspective to the extent it was lost, like, I want to reiterate, is really about admissibility. So a lot these facts -- quote, unquote, facts related to a lot of the other issues we've been talking about

today. There are facts about the prisoner pedigree card, about the prisoner roster form, about Hanrahan's reports errors, about needing to give Miranda warnings. Really almost -- I mean, I have the specific numbers, but I mean, most of them, there's a another motion in limine that bears on it, and I cited cases and treatises which speaks to the issues of just because there's an admission -- we're not running away from them -- but just because there's an admission does not mean it's admissible at trial because they're subject to rules of admissibility.

And so really understanding, maybe putting aside the ones where we argued with respect to the -- this is undisputed or the witness can testify, putting those aside, there are other ones that really speak more to admissibility, and then there are a few, a handful that speak to completeness where our admission was lengthier and they excerpted to take out context of some of our admissions. So to the extent that there's an admission, it's the entire admission, not let's just take the second half of the sentence, not the first half of the sentence.

THE COURT: Understood. Okay. So why don't we do this, I hear your point, and I tend to agree with you that some of this on relevancy depends on what my rulings are on the other disputed motions. So with the expectation and hope that I will get you a ruling on that sufficiently in advance

of trial for you to confer on these, after you receive my rulings on the other motions in limine, plaintiff's counsel, why don't you provide your adversary with a statement of any admissions you seek to offer tailored to the relevancy of what's coming into the case, do your best to agree on the language of those and what would come in, and hopefully, before the final pretrial conference, you can let me know if you've agreed, or if there's anything still in dispute. And, you know, can you address this at this time, but think about how you'd like it to come in, if you want it to be something read to the jury at the close the evidence or once we agree on the language, you know, and the testimony, the appropriate witness, just let me know.

Okay. All right. I think that's all I have on the disputed motions. I know there are some other motions outstanding.

Mr. Thadani, you're looking as if you had something else to say on that point.

MR. THADANI: No. I just want to flag before the conference ends, three just, like, housekeeping points we wanted to raise, but it doesn't have to be now.

THE COURT: That's fine. Let me go through a few things that I have. I think we'll probably still have some time for that, and if not, we can address it at the next conference, or if you need to have it addressed before then,

you can raise it with me in a letter.

Okay. I noticed this was not actually the subject of an independent motion from the defense, but that plaintiff had listed, by my count, around 20 treating physicians as potential witnesses in your joint pretrial order.

You know, I certainly think that I would, if you actually attempted to call 20, ask you to limit them.

MR. HARVIS: We're not going to be doing that. I think it's probably a handful, less than five, I think, and we can try to get that list to the City -- to defense counsel, you know, in advance of the final pretrial conference or as soon as possible.

THE COURT: Okay. I think in advance, if you can, and maybe ideally by before the Thanksgiving break, so if there are any issues, we can address those.

Yes.

MS. McKINNEY: And Your Honor, that was one of the defendant's housekeeping points was to request that if plaintiff could provide a more refind list of the treating physicians that they do intend to call. We do request -- I think it would be helpful to provide a deadline.

Could we set a deadline at today's conference for when they could provide us that list and also an order, if possible, of those witnesses, as well.

THE COURT: Why don't we deal with the witness order

158 1 point separately. 2 But do you have a timeframe in mind as to when you 3 think you can provide the list? I know because they're 4 doctors, it may depend on their availability. 5 MR. HARVIS: Precisely. I would say -- can we say November 21st. 6 7 Is that okay? 8 THE COURT: That is nine-ish days in advance of 9 trial. 10 MR. HARVIS: How about the 18th, Your Honor? Why don't we say the 18th. 11 THE COURT: Sure. 12 So November 18th. And, you know, I know that none 13 of them are going to be offered as experts. I will say I know 14 that particularly when one doctor works for, say, Queens Medical Center, it's standard for them to review the patient's 15 16 chart and rely on the history notes to the extent that that was something they actually relied on in the course of their 17 18 treatment of plaintiff, not something that they're looking 19 back at now. But, you know, subject to that bound, they're 20 obviously not going to be given any opinions other than those 21 formed during their own diagnosis and treatment. 22 MR. HARVIS: Right. 23 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think you may have 24 addressed this in our discussion about other misconduct. 25 There was an issue that came up, I think, as Ms. McKinney may

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recall, I was observing Judge Kovner's trial in the Burnet matter that she handled very deftly a weeks ago, and there was an issue that came up mid-trial about adverse credibility findings from one of the defendant's officers -- defendant officers in an unrelated case, but on a list that was maintained by the Queens County District Attorney for officers who had been found by a Court to have not been credible in that proceeding, and Judge Kovner ruled on the spot that it was admissible because it went to credibility. It's a very fact-specific inquiry. It would depend on the circumstances. I would prefer not to have to deal with that mid-trial, so I wanted to see if either party had inquired of the Queens District Attorney as to whether any of the individual defendants had had such a finding since there's now a central list that I gather is maintained. That should be something that the parties could find out relatively quickly. But if any of the defendants happen to have that history and are on the Queens DA's list, and you know, if it's not an issue, if nobody seeks to present it, it's not an issue for me. But if either party -- I presume the plaintiff in this case seeks to present it, it's something I would appreciate knowing about in advance of trial.

MR. HARVIS: Yeah, okay. I don't have that information right now. But we will find out the answer, and if there is -- if we find out in the affirmative, we'll submit

a letter to Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think that would be great. I think you can confer with your opposing counsel and see if they agree that it's properly the subject for impeachment under 608 or otherwise, if there's any objection to it coming in in the cross of an officer. If there's a problem, let me know the dispute.

It also may be -- I don't know if other than defense counsel in criminal cases, if plaintiffs in civil cases are permitted to access that information or whether it's something that only the City as counsel to those officers can get.

Obviously, you know, you have no reason necessarily to know about it before, but it would be something that if you knew about in the ordinary course of discovery, would be exchanged. I don't think this list even existed at the time you were all doing discovery in this case. So it may be simpler and faster for the City to make that inquiry as counsel for the officers, so if they don't have any objection to that --

My mic just went out. Are they shutting us down?

All right. Thank you.

MR. HARVIS: We would certainly appreciate that if the City is able to make that inquiry, that would obviously be much easier than us trying to do it.

MR. THADANI: I don't know. So I mean, I'm not saying no. I don't know what the process is for that. So I

can look into it.

THE COURT: I know Ms. McKinney, you probably have the document that was used in your trial, so perhaps, you could use that for reference. I think if you contact the executive office of the Queens District Attorney and just let them know this is the list that sometimes they call it the Brady list, sometimes they call it the adverse credibility findings you're inquiring about, and give them the officers' names, they could probably tell you pretty quickly whether it's on, and if you would like to say the judge directed you to make that inquiry, you're free to do so.

MS. McKINNEY: I do know a liaison at the Queens DA's Office that I would be happy to reach out to with that inquiry.

THE COURT: Terrific. Thank you.

Lastly, joint pretrial order, it's very long, includes a lot of exhibits that I suspect I'm going to give you all the benefit of the doubt and say that you were being over-inclusive to avoid any preclusion problems.

I do think it would be Helpful, particularly for plaintiff to narrow down just as you have with the plaintiffs, narrow down the list of exhibits. I know you're waiting for my ruling on a number of these motions. So I was thinking that you could narrow down your proposed exhibits, as well as any objections that you may have, and submit it by the end of

162 1 the day, meaning, midnight on Monday November 21st. 2 Does that seem workable? 3 MR. HARVIS: Sure. A lot of them were already 4 intentionally blank, so I'm just saying it's a little 5 deceptive, the number. 6 MR. THADANI: It's not 300, it's 200. 7 Scheduling-wise, as you guys --THE COURT: Okay. sorry, you all probably know from reviewing my rules, 8 9 typically -- there is no typical, given how new I am to this 10 job, but I've been asking for proposed voir dire, verdict 11 sheets, and jury charges to come in 10 days before jury 12 selection. We have the Thanksgiving holiday, but the 10 days 13 would fall on a Sunday, so Monday which I think is the 21st 14 would also be the day I'd ask you to submit those. 15 MR. THADANI: I thought it was two weeks. 16 Am I wrong about that? 17 THE COURT: It may have -- you know what, you may be 18 correct, and you may know my rules better than I do at this 19 point. 20 MR. THADANI: I try. That's what I have in my 21 calendar. 22 THE COURT: Okay. I'll welcome them sooner. I 23 thought given the timeframe, given that you're still waiting 24 on the rulings on my motions in limine, if you'd like to have 25 until the 21st, you can. If you'd like to do them before the

weekend, that's certainly appreciated.

Okay. I want to talk to you briefly about voir dire. So I am going to actually do a written questionnaire. In my experience, it actually saves a lot of time, and then rather than have the individual jurors tell everybody out loud how many children they have and do they have any lawyers in their family, we could just do that on the questionnaire and save the more complicated and revealing questions about things, like, potential biases, all of that, for the individual questioning.

I also think it tends to work better especially in cases of this type where jurors may have some strong feelings on either side, to question them not at sidebar, but in the jury room. So what I'd like to do is have a questionnaire that has the biographical information in there, which would include are things, like, lawyers this their family, law enforcement members in their family, that sort of thing that we may want to follow up on with individual questions. Have them do that with the written questionnaire, I'll then give you time to review it, maybe half an hour or so, then I'll deal with hardships. We could do those at sidebars. Deal with the hardships first. Once we have a pool of people who have not been excused for hardships, we can take the first 14 and go to the jury room and question them one on one. And since we're doing it there, I don't have any objection to your

164 clients being present. Obviously, they can't participate, but 1 2 I think sometimes it can be helpful for clients to share with 3 you their take on potential jurors when it comes time to do 4 the peremptories. 5 And I will probably rule on the cause challenges one I don't trust my memory to remember who said what 6 7 seven jurors ago. I had enough trouble following along when I was observing other judges do it, much less doing it on my 8 9 So you all should just be prepared to address the 10 for-cause challenges as they get excused one by one. All 11 right. And the rest, we can talk about at the final 12 13 pretrial conference. 14 Did we set a date for that yet? THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: The 28th. 15 16 THE COURT: The 28th, okay. So the 28th, the afternoon of the 28th, I believe. All right. Good. 17 18 Lastly, but certainly not least, any potential 19 vehicle or avenue for settlement discussions at this point? 20 Have you spoken recently with your clients about 21 that possibility? 22 MR. HARVIS: No. We haven't -- I mean, I -- is it 23 okay if we go off the record just for the --24 THE COURT: Sure. We'll go off the record. 25 (Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held at this

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    time.)
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              THE COURT: Let's go back on the record.
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              Before we adjourn, I have nothing else.
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              Any of the parties have anything else you'd like me
    to address?
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                                Nothing from plaintiff. Thank you
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              MR. HARVIS: No.
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    for your time. I appreciate it. It's been so generous.
8
    Thank you.
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              MR. THADANI: I still do have three things.
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              THE COURT: Okav.
              MR. THADANI: They're short, I think.
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              One is, I just want to the confirm that you will not
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    be holding trial on Fridays?
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              THE COURT: Thank you for that question. I meant to
    address it.
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              So actually, unfortunately or fortunately, I am
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    going to be holding trial that Friday. I believe it's
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    December 2nd, perhaps.
19
              Is that right? Yes.
                                    Okay.
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              Yeah, because we're starting on a Wednesday, rather
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    than have the jury start, appear a day and a half or so of
22
    testimony and argument and then take a three-day break, I am
23
    inclined to do a half day on Friday just to give me time to do
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    some other matters and give you a break. So I think we'll
    probably go up to the lunch break at 1:00, and then excuse the
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    jurors and excuse you, and then we can reconvene on Monday.
              MR. THADANI: I'm glad I asked that question.
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              THE COURT: I am too.
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              MR. THADANI: The other one is, so I think we left
    it with the three nonparty police officers Pontecorvo,
 5
    Trotter, and Valerga. Plaintiff's counsel is going to
 6
 7
    consider their position, we'll confer and see if there are
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    disputes.
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              Do I have that right?
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              MR. HARVIS: That sounds good to me.
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              MR. THADANI: I just wanted to the flag one other
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                 I don't know if this was an inadvertent mistake
    individual.
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    or you know, I'm not sure. There's another nonparty. His
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    last name is Ripple. He is on the witness list, he was not in
    the list of individuals plaintiff's counsel indicated no
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    longer seeking to call. So I just --
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              MR. HARVIS: We don't be need to call him.
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              MR. THADANI: There you go. That's taken care of.
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              So the last one is really, is there guidance in
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    terms of if we want to schedule a tech walk-through.
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              Let me back up.
22
              Do you know whether the trial is going to happen in
23
    this courtroom?
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              THE COURT: It is going to be in this courtroom.
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              MR. THADANI: Okay. And to the extent that that's
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167 1 the case, is there some quidance to schedule, like, an -- an 2 opportunity work with the technology and get familiar with it? Yes. The good news is, at this 3 THE COURT: 4 juncture, I do not have a lot scheduled in this courtroom over 5 the next few weeks. We have some occasional conferences, but a lot of them are by phone, and as of now, only one or two 6 7 other hearings. So there should be plenty of time, so I think 8 you should contact my deputy Freddie Valderrama, and you're 9 welcome to have that time. 10 And we are trying to ensure that the screen has good 11 enough resolution for your exhibits to be seen. I know that's 12 been an issue in some other parts of the courthouse, but we're 13 working on that with IT. 14 MR. THADANI: That is all I have. THE COURT: And if you want to come in over 15 16 Thanksgiving break to do a tech walk-through, it'll be nice and empty. I'm kidding. No one will be here. But we'll do 17 18 it as close in time as possible. 19 Anything else? 20 MR. HARVIS: Not from plaintiff. 21 THE COURT: All right. With that, we're adjourned. 22 (Whereupon, the matter was concluded.) 23 24 25